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I.

Introduction

No one doubts the profound impact that technological change has had upon
society and the environment throughout history.1 The internal combustion engine,
plastics, microelectronics: these and other innovations have contributed to economic
growth, but have also imposed significant burdens on the environment.2 Yet the
relationship between technology, economic growth and environmental quality is both
complicated and nuanced. While some may view technological change as the bane of
environmental protection, many others consider it to be a critical element of effective
environmental policy.3
In thinking about environmental policy and technological change, it is helpful
to separate the concept of technological change into two parts:

“commercial

innovation” and “environmental innovation”. Commercial innovation refers to the
invention, development and ultimate diffusion of new products or processes for
commercial

purposes,

for

example

to

enhance

a

firm’s

productivity

or

competitiveness.4 Commercial innovation would include such things as the personal
computer, the cellular telephone, and the compact disc.

Environmental innovation

See John T. Preston, Technology Innovation and Environmental Progress, in THINKING ECOLOGICALLY 136, 136
(Daniel C. Esty & Marian R. Chertow eds. 1997).
2 Giovanni Dosi, The Research on Innovation Diffusion: An Assessment, in DIFFUSION OF TECHNOLOGIES AND SOCIAL
BEHAVIOR 179, 179-80 (Nebojša Naki enovi and Arnulf Grubler eds. 1991) (hereinafter “Assessment”).
3 See, e.g., DAVID M. DRIESEN, THE ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW __-__ (2003); RENE KEMP,
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND TECHNICAL CHANGE1 (1997); Scott R. Milliman & Raymond Prince, Firm Incentives to
Promote Technological Change in Pollution Control, 17 J. ENVTL. ECON. AND MGMT. 247, 247 (1989); ALLEN V.
KNEESE & CHARLES L SCHULTZE, POLLUTION, PRICES AND PUBLIC POLICY 82 (1975) (“[O]ver the long haul, perhaps
the most important single criterion on which to judge environmental policies is the extent to which they spur new
technology toward the efficient conservation of environmental quality.”)
4 See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (“OECD), ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND
TECHNICAL CHANGE 10 (1985) (defining “general business innovation” to be innovations made for commercial
purposes); Richard B. Stewart, Regulation, Innovation and Administrative Law: A Conceptual Framework, 89 CAL.
L. REV. 1256, 1261 (1982) (defining “market innovation” to include innovations the “increase market measures of
output per unit of labor or other input and thus increase productivity as measured by traditional national income
accounting.”)
1
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contemplates product or process innovations intended to reduce or remediate the
impacts of human activity on public health and the environment.5 Environmental
innovation encompasses environmentally beneficial technologies, such as pollution
control technologies or “clean technologies” that reduce or eliminate the generation
of pollution during production.6
Environmental innovation offers at least two significant social benefits
beyond the obvious potential economic value inherent in technological innovation
generally.7 First, it allows us to keep pace with the increasing flow of environmental
issues, providing new responses and solutions to emerging concerns.8 For example,
the same industry that brought us ozone-depleting chlorofluorocarbons also
developed non-CFC substitutes when public policy and international accords
demanded it.9

Second, environmental innovation can also reduce the cost of

pollution management, making environmental improvement less expensive. Such
cost-reducing changes can ease the perceived conflict between environmental

See OECD, supra, n. __, at 10 (discussing “compliance innovations” designed to ensure compliance with
environmental regulations at the lowest cost); Stewart, Conceptual Framework, supra, n. __, at 1261 (describing
“social innovation” to include new products and processes that are less polluting and safer.)
6 Environmental technologies typically include (1) pollution control technologies designed to capture and then
destroy or immobilize pollutants before they enter the environment, (2) pollution prevention technologies such as
process changes, product changes or recycling efforts intended to reduce the creation of pollutants at the source, and
(4) remediation technologies intended to clean up the environment after it has been affected by pollutants.
NATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND TECHNOLOGY (NACEPT), REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION AND ECONOMICS COMMITTEE, PERMITTING AND COMPLIANCE
POLICY: BARRIERS TO U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION 22 (1991) [hereinafter BARRIERS)
(establishing a “hierarchy of technological approaches to environmental improvement,” including pollution
prevention, recycling, control, and cleanup technologies); KEMP, supra, n. __, at 11. “Clean technologies” are a
subset of environmental technologies that a technology or process that generates less waste or emissions than the
norm. David Allen, The Chemical Industry: Process Changes and the Search for Cleaner Technologies, in REDUCING
TOXICS ___ (Robert Gottlieb ed. 1995).
7 OECD, supra, n. __, at 9-11 (discussing the vital contribution that technical change makes to economic growth and
productivity); Zvi Griliches. R&D and Productivity: Econometric Results and Measurement Issues 52, 81(describing
research and development as a “major source of economic growth”).
8 See, e.g., GEORGE HEATON ET AL., TRANSFORMING TECHNOLOGY: AN AGENDA FOR ENVIRONMENTALLY SUSTAINABLE
GROWTH IN THE 21ST CENTURY 1 (1991); Richard B. Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law: A
Conceptual Framework, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1256, 1260-61 (1981) [hereinafter Conceptual Framework]; NACEPT,
BARRIERS, supra, n. __, at 27. The Superfund program provides one striking example of this point. As knowledge of
the nature and scope of various forms of environmental contamination grew, government and private researchers
began to develop improved and new technologies to address the varied forms of contamination. For example, today
there are numerous technologies available to remediating various forms of soil contamination, including soil vapor
extraction, in situ thermal treatment and phytoremediation (which uses plants to withdraw contaminants from the
soil).
5
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protection and economic development, and thus provide for continued growth in both
areas.10 Consequently, most regulators and commentators conclude that regulation
should be crafted so as to encourage and support environmental innovation.11
However, policy makers and scholars continue to struggle over exactly how to
accomplish that goal.12 In the legal literature in particular, debate concentrates
primarily on whether the dominant "command and control" form of regulation
prevents businesses from developing and adopting innovative environmental
technologies.13

Although this debate has produced many helpful insights, its

generally myopic focus on regulatory form and standard economic analysis
ultimately limits its usefulness. Regulation must operate in the real world, and in
the real world regulation is but one of many interrelated factors that affect a
business firm’s behavior.
In this article, turn attention to the broader socio-economic factors that affect
innovative behavior by business firms.

A firm’s technology choices—and its

response to regulations intended to shape those choices—are influenced by other
actors (such as suppliers, trade associations, customers, and competitors), by

See KEMP, supra, n. __, at 225-230 (discussing the phase out of CFCs).
Timothy F. Malloy, Regulating by Incentives: Myths, Models and Micromarkets, 80 TEX. L. REV 531, 541-42 (2002)
(observing that innovation can provide the basis for reaching agreement on how to respond to the question of global
warming); Adam B. Jaffe & Robert N. Stavins, Dynamic Incentives of Environmental Regulations: The Effects of
Alternative Policy Instruments on Technology Diffusion, 29 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. S-44 (1995).
11 See, e.g., Stewart, Conceptual Framework, supra, n. __, at 1261; NACEPT, BARRIERS, supra, n. __, at 21; OECD,
supra, n. __, at 81; Cf. Ian W. H. Parry et al., How Important is Technological Innovation in Protecting the
Environment?, at 5, (Resources for the Future, Discussion Paper 00-15) (2000) (observing that in terms of social
welfare, promoting technological change may be less important than simply controlling pollution).
12 See, e.g., Malloy, Incentives, supra, n. __, at 542-551 (discussing the debate over the use of market-based programs
versus traditional regulation to encourage innovation); Stewart, Conceptual Framework, supra, n. __, at 1364-1373
(presenting a series of proposed regulatory changes); ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE (ELI), INNOVATION, COST AND
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: PERSPECTIVES ON BUSINESS, POLICY AND LEGAL FACTORS AFFECTING THE COST OF
COMPLIANCE (1999) [hereinafter PERSPECTIVES]; DRIESEN, ECONOMIC DYNAMICS, supra, n. __, at __-__.
9
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external social and legal institutions (for example, industry standards and norms)
and by the firm’s internal structure (such as internal research and development
funding policies).

Consequently, regulators seeking to encourage technological

innovation in a given industry sector must first understand the socio-economic
environment created by the network or “system” of actors, institutions, and routines
in that particular sector. Regulatory policy designed without this system in mind
will often ignore significant relationships and interactions within the relevant
system, and consequently fail to produce the behavior it seeks.
Obviously, attempting to catalog and synthesize every factor that affects
technology choice is neither feasible nor useful. Rather, we propose to focus on a
small set of socio-economic factors—called the “selection environment” by Nelson
and Winter and other evolutionary economists—that play a significant role in
technology choice. Certainly, the regulatory obligations and constraints facing a
firm are a critical part of the selection environment, but the selection environment
also includes the mechanisms by which information about the innovation flows to
potential adopters; the attributes of the innovation and its value to the potential
adopters (i.e., the benefits and costs of adoption); and the strength of pre-existing
routines and behaviors exhibited by relevant individuals and organizations.14

An

understanding of the selection environment allows policymakers to do three things:
detect systemic barriers to innovation, identify regulatory alternatives that would
specifically address those barriers, and anticipate how the system will likely respond
to the various alternatives.

13 See Malloy, Incentives, supra n. __, at 544-46 (providing overview of debate).
KEMP, supra, n. __, at 275-277 (discussing the broad range of technical, economic and institutional relationships
that influence the decision of whether to adopt new technology); NELSON & WINTER, supra, n. __, at 263 (specifying
for elements of the selection environment.)
14
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This article demonstrates the application of the selection environment
approach through a case study of the dry cleaning sector in Southern California.
Most professional drycleaners use perchloroethylene ("PCE"), a toxic chemical, as
their primary cleaning solvent.

One non-toxic alternative cleaning technology,

known as “professional wet cleaning,” has been demonstrated to be both technically
viable and economically competitive with the dominant PCE-based technology.15 Yet
relatively few cleaners have adopted wet cleaning technology, despite both the
pervasive regulation of PCE dry cleaning and the availability of various voluntary
incentive programs in California and elsewhere intended to encourage its diffusion.
Recently, the South Coast Air Quality Management District (“AQMD”), the
regulatory agency with jurisdiction over air emissions in the Los Angeles region,
adopted an even more aggressive approach to encouraging technology change. It
revised its air pollution regulations governing dry cleaning operations to prohibit the
use of PCE dry cleaning equipment after 2020, and to provide limited financial

Liquid carbon dioxide (CO2) has also been introduced as an alternative solvent for garment cleaning. By placing
gaseous CO2 under pressure, this equipment makes it a liquid with solvent properties David DeRosa, Out of Fashion
Moving Beyond Toxic Cleaners in the Fabric Care Industry 16-17 (2001). There is currently one plant in the South
Coast utilizing a CO2 machine. SCAQMD, Staff Report, at 1-2. CO2 machines are quite expensive. The typical cost
estimate for the purchase and installation of a CO2 machine is $150,000. However, cleaners purchasing a machine
from Micell, the leading manufacturer, must also pay costs associated with obtaining a franchise from Micell, which
can raise capital costs to between $500,000 to $800,000 United States Congress, Committee on Small Business,
Subcommittee on Tax, Finance and Exports, Helping Small Dry Cleaners Adopt Safer Technology: Without Losing
Your Shirt. 106th Cong., 2nd sess. (July 20, 2000) (testimony of Fisher); South Coast Air Quality Management
District (“SCAQMD”), Staff Report for Proposed Amendment to Rule 1421 – Control of Perchloroethylene Emissions
from Dry Cleaning Systems 1-21 (2002) (hereinafter “Staff Report”).. Micell’s CO2 garment cleaning line was
purchased by Cool Clean Technologies. See wttp://www.co2olclean.com (visited June 3, 2003).
15

General Electric has also introduced a new silicone-based dry cleaning solvent, marketed under the name Green
Earth™ that uses a cyclopentasiloxane mixture as a solvent. However, researchers have raised concerns about the
toxicity of the solvent, and about wastes potentially generated in the production of the siloxanes (dioxin and other
organochlorine compounds) and from the breakdown of used solvent (formaldehyde). DeRosa, supra, n. __, at 17.
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incentives to first-movers who adopt wet cleaning or other non-polluting alternatives
in the shorter term.16
The situation in Southern California raises two basic questions about
diffusion of wet cleaning, the answers to which provide policymakers with insights
applicable to other technologies as well.

First, if wet cleaning is a competitive,

commercially viable, non-polluting alternative, why has it failed to spread
throughout the sector? Second, what is the most effective policy tool or combination
of tools for responding to the apparently slow diffusion of this clean technology? The
AQMD took the controversial step of requiring an entire industry to alter its basic
production process; would other options such as taxes, stricter regulation of PCE or
subsidies have achieved equivalent results with less social cost? We use an analysis
of the selection environment to explore these questions.
To gather information concerning technology choice within this sector, we
conducted a random sample survey of 202 dry cleaners located in the greater Los
Angeles region, and a series of semi-structured interviews of equipment vendors,
professional cleaners, and government officials.17 All surveys and interviews were
completed before August 2001, the month in which AQMD first announced its
intention to consider a PCE prohibition. This article relies upon the survey and
interview results, as well as other publicly available information, to construct a
conceptual model of the “professional cleaning” system and the associated selection

16 See SCAQMD, Summary of Minutes of the South Coast Air Quality Management District Governing Board
(December 6, 2002).
17 More specifically, the survey assessed the attitudes of dry cleaners towards technology choice, and towards
professional wet cleaning in particular. These topics covered in the survey included: experience as a professional
cleaner, familiarity of different garment care technologies, knowledge of professional wet cleaning, factors
influencing a decision to purchase professional wet clean equipment, and interest in programs which would reduce
the cost of purchasing wet clean equipment. The results, which are reported throughout this article, are accurate to
+ 3.5% at a confidence interval of 95%.
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environment.18 It then uses that model and the underlying empirical information to
identify the critical barriers to diffusion of wet cleaning, and to examine how
different types of policy tools might affect those barriers.
Our analysis of the dry cleaning sector leads to three general conclusions.
First, absent some form of intervention, diffusion of clean technology in this sector
was likely to be extremely slow for several, interrelated reasons. Information flow
within the selection environment regarding the nature and benefits of wet cleaning
(and the disadvantages of the dominant technology) is sluggish at best.

Also,

organizational barriers within the relevant regulatory agency impair the effect of
existing air quality regulation on the rate of diffusion.

Moreover, the marginal

economic benefits to the cleaners of adopting wet cleaning technology are relatively
small. The second conclusion is that government-initiated financial incentives and
information strategies standing alone are unlikely to successfully increase the rate
of diffusion. Third, in the context of this selection environment, direct prohibition of
PCE dry cleaning, phased in over time, is likely to lead to a more timely, less costly
shift to wet cleaning and other alternative technologies than other policy tools.
Parts II and III of the article provide the background needed to evaluate the
influence of the selection environment on technology choice in this sector. Part II

18 The article thus uses a "systems approach" to expressly incorporate consideration of relevant actors, institutions,
and routines into the analysis of technological change. A systems approach is an empirically driven methodology
used to analyze complex systems by breaking them into their component parts, and examining how those parts
relate to one another and contribute to the functioning of the system. It requires collection of extensive information
concerning the system to aid in identifying (1) the scope of the system in question (i.e., which actors, institutions,
and routines are relevant), (2) the interests of the system participants, and (3) the manner in which the participants
interact. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Cornell Article; Lynn M. LoPucki, Twerski and Cohen's Second Revolution: A
Systems/Strategic Perspective, 94 Northwestern L. Rev. 94, __-___ (1999).
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defines innovation more precisely, and develops the concept of the selection
environment more fully.

Part III presents an overview of professional cleaning

technology and the dry cleaning sector. With this background in mind, Part IV
evaluates the selection environment of the dry cleaning sector, identifying several
significant barriers to the diffusion of wet cleaning technology.

Lastly, Part V

examines the likely effect of various policy responses to the slow rate of diffusion,
including the prohibition adopted by AQMD.
II.

Technological Change, Diffusion and the Selection Environment

Technological change is commonly described as including three distinct
components: invention, innovation, and diffusion.19 Invention is the creation of a
new product, process or concept. Innovation is the conversion of that invention into
a commercially viable product or process. Diffusion is the broad adoption of the
innovation by the intended end users.20 While some commentators have questioned
the value of trifurcating of the concept of technological change21, thinking about
diffusion as a separate component is a useful construct in analyzing the dry cleaning
sector.

This is so because wet cleaning is technically mature and commercially

viable, and the issue facing regulators is how to encourage adoption of this and other
nontoxic alternatives in the short term—a classic question of diffusion.

19 See, e.g. Nicholas A. Ashford & George R. Heaton, Jr., Regulation and Technology Innovation in the Chemical
Industry, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 110 (1983); KEMP, supra, n. __, at 7-8; Stewart, Conceptual Framework,
supra, n. __, at 1282. The tripartite view of technological change can be traced back to Joseph Schumpeter’s seminal
work in the field. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1974)
20
Ashford & Heaton, supra, n. __, at ___; Stewart, Conceptual Framework, supra, n. __, at 1282. In practice, technological change is
not quite so linear. New products and production processes are often subject to further development as the process of diffusion moves
forward. KEMP, supra, n. __, at 8-9. For example, even as the early wet cleaning processes were moving to market, further
refinements to tensioning equipment were being made, improving the performance of the wet cleaning systems and enhancing
diffusion opportunities.
21See, e.g. NELSON AND WINTER, supra, n. __, at 263 (question the usefulness of the distinction between invention
and innovation); P.A. Geroski, Models of Technology Diffusion, 29 RESEARCH POLICY 603, 623 (2000) (cautioning that
“[d]iffusion is as much a process by which new technologies are developed as it is a process by which usage
spreads.”); Gerald Silverberg, Adoption and Diffusion of Technology as a Collective Evolutionary Process, in
DIFFUSION OF TECHNOLOGIES AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 209, 210 (Nebojša Naki enovi and Arnulf Grubler eds. 1991)
(questioning the value of the linear view of technical change introduced by Schumpeter).
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The theoretical and empirical literature on diffusion is both voluminous and
diverse22, and a comprehensive summary of that literature is beyond the scope of this
article.23 Nonetheless, diffusion studies in many different industrial sectors support
two general conclusions. First, diffusion of new technologies tends to be slow, even
for technologies that are clearly superior to the dominant technology in terms
performance or cost.24

Second, although the rate of diffusion varies across

technologies, firms, industry sectors, and countries,25 the pattern of diffusion is fairly
consistent across those variables. In particular, diffusion rates tend to rise very
slowly at first, then increase rapidly for a time, and thereafter enter another period
of slow adoption until most potential users have switched to the innovation.26
Diffusion researchers--and economists in particular--have been intrigued by
the apparently routine failure of firms to move more quickly to superior

PAUL STONEMAN, THE ECONOMICS OF TECHNOLOGICAL DIFFUSION 3-4 (2002)(hereinafter “TECHNOLOGICAL
DIFFUSION”); Jaffe, et al., supra, n. __, at __-___. Diffusion research is conducted by a diverse group of scholars,
including economists, sociologists, anthropologists, and marketing and management theorists. KEMP, supra, n. __,
at 71.
23 For useful surveys of the diffusion literature, see Geroski, supra, n. __, at 604-14; KEMP, supra, n. __, at 70-94;
STONEMAN, TECHNOLOGICAL DIFFUSION, supra, n. __, at 29-54.
24 STONEMAN, TECHNOLOGICAL DIFFUSION, supra, n. __, at 25; Geroski, supra, n. __, at 604; Dosi, Assessment, supra,
n. __, at 184-85. For example, in a classic study, Mansfield documented the following times for half of the potential
adopters to use the new technologies:
22

Innovation
By-product coke oven
Centralized traffic control
Industrial robots
Diesel locomotives
High speed bottle filler
Continuous mining machine
Tin container

No. of Years for ½ to Adopt
15
14
12
9
6
3
1

Edwin Mansfield, Industrial Roberts in Japan and the USA, 18 RESEARCH POLICY 183 (1989)
25STONEMAN, TECHNOLOGICAL DIFFUSION, supra, n. __, at 12-23.
26 Id. at 12; Geroski, supra, n. __, at 604; Dosi, Assessment, supra, n. __, at 185. Commentators often refer the Sshaped diffusion curve in describing this pattern. When the fraction of potential users who have adopted the
innovation is plotted against time, the resulting time path of adoption follows an S-curve. KEMP, supra, n. __, at 7273; Jaffe, et al., supra, n. __, at 17.
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technologies.27 There are two leading explanations: “epidemic” models and rational
choice models.28 Epidemic models focus on information flow, essentially assuming
that diffusion is constrained by the slow dissemination of information about the
innovation.

As information reaches more and more firms, the rate of diffusion

increases and use of the innovation spreads like an epidemic.29 Rational choice
models concentrate instead on the potential adopters, positing that differences
among them—such as size, capabilities, goals—determine the relative value of the
innovation to the various firms.

Firms switch to the new innovation when the

benefits of switching outweigh the costs.30 As attributes of the innovation change
(such as price, reliability, performance, and so on), its value to more and more firms
increases, leading to accelerated diffusion.31
While both types of models provide powerful insights into diffusion, neither
offers a completely satisfying explanation of diffusion patterns or human behavior.
For example, for most epidemic models, the major barrier to diffusion is simply a
lack of knowledge regarding the existence and capabilities of the innovation. These
models generally assume that once the information is received through word of
mouth contact, adoption will occur.32

Little attention is given to the sources,

credibility, or accuracy of information, nor to the role of uncertainty or economic

Geroski, supra, n. __, at 604.
KEMP, supra, n. __, at 71. Of course, there are other explanations beyond these two dominant models. See, e,g.,
Stanley J. Metcalfe, The Economic Foundation of Technology Policy: Equilibrium and Evolutionary Perspectives, in
HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 409 (Paul Stoneman, ed. 1995)
(describing evolutionary models of diffusion); Richard R. Nelson, Recent Theorizing about Economic Change, 33 J.
ECON. LIT. 48, 67-72 (1995) (same); Jennifer Reinganum, On the Diffusion of New Technology, 58 REV. ECONOMIC
STUDIES 495 (1981)(discussing a game theoretic model); Geroski, supra, n. __, at 615-17 (describing a model drawn
from population ecology); Brian W. Arthur, Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-in by Historical
Events, 99 Economic Journal 116 (1989) (setting fort a model based on path dependence and information cascades).
29 Jaffe, et al., supra, n. __, at 18-19; STONEMAN, TECHNOLOGICAL DIFFUSION, supra, n. __, at 29-31.
30 KEMP, supra, n. __, at 79-82; STONEMAN, TECHNOLOGICAL DIFFUSION, supra, n. __, at 33-34.
31 STONEMAN, TECHNOLOGICAL DIFFUSION, supra, n. __, at 34; Gersoki, supra, n. __, at 610-11.
32 STONEMAN, TECHNOLOGICAL DIFFUSION, supra, n. __, at 29-30; KEMP, supra, n. __, at 76-77.
27
28
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considerations in the adoption decision.33 The rational choice models face their own
limitations, including the assumption of complete information and the failure to
consider the impact of routines and search heuristics on behavior.34
The concept of the selection environment incorporates the insights of the
epidemic and rational choice models into a broader institutional context, examining
the role that entities and institutions other than the firm have on the firm’s adoption
decision. It draws upon the evolutionary theory developed by Nelson and Winter,
which posits that diffusion begins when firms engage in “search” routines to identify
and evaluate potential changes in their ways of doing things.35 In a process akin to
natural selection, firms whose search routines result in the adoption of a profitable
innovation will thrive, and eventually the innovation will diffuse throughout the
sector and replace the dominant technology.36 The features of the socio-economic
system in which the firms operate—what Nelson and Winter call the selection
environment—determines the path of diffusion over time.37 For our purposes, the
selection environment includes: (1) the nature of the mechanisms by which firms
learn about potential innovations, (2) the nature of the costs and benefits considered

STONEMAN, TECHNOLOGICAL DIFFUSION, supra, n. __, at 32; Gersoki, supra, n. __, at 609.
See, KEMP, , supra, n. __, at 83; NELSON & WINTER, supra, n. __, at ___-___. PAUL STONEMAN, THE ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 104 (1983 (hereinafter “TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE”). Some rational choice
models take on the issue of incomplete information directly, using a Bayesian learning rules in which the firm
updates its prior information about the technology. See, e.g, I. Tonks, The Demand for Innovation and the Diffusion
of New Products, 4 INT’L J. INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 397.
35 NELSON & WINTER, supra, n. __, at 206-07. Nelson and Winter’s evolutionary theory characterized firms as
“possessing various capabilities, procedures and decision rules that determine what they do in given external
conditions.” NELSON & WINTER, supra, n. __, at 206-07.
36 NELSON & WINTER, supra, n. __, at 262-63. The diffusion can occur through one of two mechanisms. First, the
initial adopter will grow absolutely and relatively (in comparison to its competitors) and will make broader use of
the innovation in its expanded operations. NELSON & WINTER, supra, n. __, at 265; STONEMAN, TECHNOLOGICAL
DIFFUSION, supra, n. __, at 7 (describing the process of “intra-firm diffusion”). Second, the innovation may spread to
33
34
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by the firm in deciding whether to adopt the innovation, (3) the nature of the firm’s
search routines, and (4) the manner in which consumer preferences and government
regulation influence what is profitable.38

We describe each component in more

detail below, beginning with information flow.

A.

Information Flow Within the Sector
It is clear that information flow is an important component of the diffusion

process.39 In order to adopt a new technology, the potential user must obviously first
be aware of its existence, capabilities and costs. The decision to switch also involves
consideration of the capabilities and pitfalls of the existing technology. Case studies
in a variety of sectors have demonstrated that lack of adequate information
concerning the new technology can be a significant barrier to diffusion.40
While the epidemic approach highlights the importance of information flow, it
provides little help in sorting through the mechanisms and impacts of that flow.
Under the epidemic approach, diffusion of wet cleaning would occur as information
about its existence and (at least in some variants of the classic model) its
performance reached more and more cleaners. Yet the approach does not consider

other firms through imitation, as the other firms attempt to maintain their competitive status. NELSON & WINTER,
supra, n. __
, at 265.
37 NELSON & WINTER, supra, n. __, at 263.
38 With the exception of the third element, this definition of selection environment relies upon Nelson and Winter’s
original formulation. Id. In recognition of the threshold importance of the firm’s internal search routines for
identifying evaluating potential innovations, I include such routines as a fourth element that affects the adoption
decision. Nelson and Winter treat the search function as a separate part of their model.
In his discussion of technological regime shifts (i.e., radical changes in basic technologies of production, transport
and consumption), Kemp uses the concept of selection environment to capture the larger technical and socioeconomic system in which diffusion occurs. For Kemp, the selection environment includes (1) the existing technical,
economic and institutional interrelationships created by the dominant technology, (2) the mechanisms for the
transfer of information needed for the switch to occur, (3) social processes of habitation and taste formation, and (4)
existing government policies. KEMP, supra, n. __, at 274-76.
39 KEMP, supra, n. __, at 96-98; EVERETT M. ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS 17-18 (1995).
40 See, e.g., KEMP, supra, n. __, at 234 (observing that lack of information of the environmental damage caused by
high- solvent paints and of the availability of low-solvent alternatives hindered the diffusion of low-solvent
alternatives).
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quality of the information itself, and thus is of limited use in situations in which
inaccurate, negative information about the new technology is circulating within the
sector. Moreover, by focusing primarily on word of mouth contact as the mechanism
of information flow, the epidemic approach tends to ignore other potentially
important information sources such suppliers, trade associations, and regulators.
Analysis of the broader selection environment results in more attention to the
substance and sources of the information transmitted. For example, it might seem
reasonable to assume that the vendor of a new technology would vigorously spread
information about its product or process. Yet in practice, this assumption could
easily prove to be false; distributors of the new technology may have their own
interest in restricting or even distorting the information that reaches the potential
adopter.41 Analysis of the selection environment also includes consideration of the
weight accorded to various pieces of information and their respective sources by the
potential adopter. Not all information sources are equal in their eyes. Thus, a
potential adopter may discount the value of information provided by the vendor,
viewing the vendor’s claims about the innovation to be puffery.

Likewise,

statements by government regulators about new technologies may be viewed with
distrust or skepticism. By recognizing these aspects of information flow, evaluation
of the selection environment can uncover otherwise unseen barriers to the flow of
accurate information, and assist in developing effective policy responses to those
barriers.
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Costs and Benefits of the New Technology
This component incorporates the core concept of the rational choice approach:

the firm will adopt the innovation when the benefits of adoption exceed the costs.
The value of the innovation to individual firms will vary across the sector, and as the
costs of the innovation drop or its benefits increase, more and more firms will switch
from the dominant technology.42 Whatever one has to say about the usefulness of
formal theories of rational choice generally, it is difficult to argue with the basic idea
that, in the case of business decisions concerning technology choice, cost matters.43
Nonetheless, this focus on the costs and benefits of adoption does present its own
challenges. In particular, it can often be quite difficult to identify the nature and
magnitude of the costs and benefits that drive the adoption decision.
On the surface, identifying the types of costs and benefits associated with
adopting a new technology may appear to be a relatively straightforward exercise.44
In practice, however, the analysis of the relative costs and benefits of adoption can
be significantly more complicated than it first appears. It is not enough to simply

41 KEMP, supra, n. __, at 98-99 (suggesting that sales people might advocate against the purchase of new technology
where the existing technology results in higher profits of sales commissions.)
42 STONEMAN, TECHNOLOGICAL DIFFUSION, supra, n. __, at 33-34; KEMP, supra, n. __, at 79-80. In formal rational
choice models of diffusion, the decision rule is often pegged to a threshold criteria which, if exceeded, causes the
innovation to have a net benefit for the firm. For example, firm size is often used as the threshold criteria. Upon
introduction, the costs of a new innovation may exceed its value for smaller firms but not for larger firms. As the
costs decrease or the value increases, the threshold criteria (i.e., the firm size above which the innovation has net
value) decreases, and more and more firms begin to adopt the innovation. See KEMP, supra, n. __, at 80-83
(describing the probit model which typically uses firm size as the “critical variate”); Jaffe, et. al, supra, n. __, at ____.
43 Obviously, there is continuing debate over the use of rational choice theory in a variety of substantive areas and
across a number of disciplines. For examples of the standard critiques of rational choice theory generally, see
ROBYN M. DAWES, RATIONAL CHOICE IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 146 (1988); RATIONALITY IN ECONOMICS:
ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES (KEN DENNIS ED., 1988); MARY ZEY, RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY AND ORGANIZATIONAL
THEORY: A CRITIQUE (1998).
44 In applying the classic “probit” rational choice model to the diffusion of the labor-saving mechanic reaper in 19th
century America, David focused the wage rates and on capital and maintenance costs of the reaper. Paul David, A
Contribution to the Theory of Diffusion __ (Center for Research in Economic Growth Research Memorandum No. 71
1969). Likewise, in their rational choice model of the adoption of energy –conserving technology, Jaffe and Stavins
concentrated on energy costs and the costs of adopting thermal insulation technology. Adam B. Jaffe & Robert N.
Stavins, Dynamic Incentives of Environmental Regulations: The Effects of Alternative Policy Instruments on
Technology Diffusion, 29 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. S-43, ___ (1995).
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know the objective costs and benefits of adoption; one must also understand the
magnitude and relative importance of those costs and benefits as perceived by the
potential adopters.45
The potential adopter’s view of the costs and benefits can influence the
adoption decision in at least three ways. First, uncertainty about the value of a
particular cost or benefit, whether based upon an actual absence of information or
on impaired flow of existing information, may lead the firm to either discount the
cost or benefit or delay adoption until the uncertainty is reduced.46

Second,

behavioral biases may cause potential adopters to give a cost or benefit more or less
weight than an objective observer might expect.

For example, studies of the

diffusion of energy-efficiency technologies have found that adopters tend to give
more importance to capital costs than to long-term operating costs in evaluating the
financial costs of the new technology.47

Third, the potential adopter’s beliefs or

preferences may cause an ostensible cost or benefit to be irrelevant to that firm.

C.

Search and Adoption Routines
The first two components of the selection environment fit neatly within

commonly held conceptions of the diffusion process.

Imagine a small metal

45 The analysis is also complicated by the fact that the magnitude of the costs and benefits is a moving target. They
will likely vary over time as the firm’s experience with the new technology increases, and as the technology itself is
improved as a result of feedback received during the diffusion process. Silverberg, supra, n. __, at 211-12.
46 Jaffe, et al., supra, n. __, at 40; STONEMAN, TECHNOLOGICAL DIFFUSION, supra, n. __, at 54. The uncertainty may
rest in the newness of the technology, giving rise to concerns over how it will perform in a particular application.
Alternatively, the uncertainty might instead relate to its operating costs. Id.
47 K. A. Hassett and G. E. Metcalf, Energy Tax Credits and Residential Conservation Investment: Evidence from
Panel Data, 57 J. PUBLIC ECONOMICS 201, ____ (1995);
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fabrication firm receiving information through the mass media, equipment vendors,
and word of mouth about a new environmentally beneficial coating technology used
to paint metal shelves. Perhaps the firm’s plant manager reviews the information,
collects further data relating to the technology’s performance and cost, and
ultimately determines that switching to the new process will result in a modest
financial benefit for the firm. On the basis of that analysis the firm purchases the
new coating technology. This scenario is consistent with much of the modeling of
innovation and diffusion that is typically conducted; yet it artificially isolates the
firm’s adoption decision from the rest of the firm’s activities.
The adoption decision looks quite different when viewed in the larger context
of the firm’s general business operations. At each step, the innovation competes
against other firm activities and opportunities for attention and resources.
Organizational theory and behavioral science suggest that firms and individuals
contending with numerous competing demands for attention and resources often
depend upon organizational routines and rules of thumb to sort through the
turbulent business environment.48 To the extent that such routines influence the
search and selection activities of firms within a given sector, analysis of diffusion
within the sector must include consideration of those routines.
Will the firm’s plant manager pay attention to the advertisements and sales
calls concerning the new process? To a large extent, the answer to that question
depends upon the number and nature of the other items vying for the manager’s
attention. An individual’s capacity to identify and process information is limited,
and consequently attention itself is a resource that must be allocated in accordance

48

See Timothy F. Malloy, Regulation, Compliance and the Firm, 76 TEMPLE L. REV. 451, 478-80 (2003).
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with some set of decision rules.49 For example, behavioral scientists tell us that
individuals will not engage in search and evaluation activities until they perceive or
anticipate a problem to be solved.50 Stoneman relied on this principle to explain, in
part, the slow diffusion of computers in the 1970’s, noting, “prior to a change in
technique a problem is required.”51 Likewise, Nelson and Winter incorporated this
principle into their evolutionary model of technological change, assuming that a firm
will not search for innovations if the firm is already “sufficiently profitable.”52
Even if the manager notices and evaluates the innovation, will the firm
purchase it? Again the answer depends upon the other investment opportunities
and resource needs facing the firm. The innovation must compete against other
projects for capital and other resources.53 In many firms the competition will be
based on such factors as return on investment, consistency with the firm’s strategic
goals, and the relative power of the sub-units sponsoring the respective projects.
Research in this area suggests that these factors systematically disadvantage
projects implementing environmentally beneficial innovations.54

49 HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 88-92 (Free Press 4th ed. 1997) (observing that bounded rationality
resulting from cognitive and physiological limits restricts the scope of individuals’ attention); JAMES G. MARCH, A
PRIMER ON DECISION MAKING, 23-24 (1994).
50 See, e.g., RICHARD M. CYERT & JAMES G. MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM __-__ (1963).
51 STONEMAN, TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE, supra, n. __, at 140. See also, KEMP, supra, n. __, at 83, n. 11 (arguing that
bounded rationality may limit adoption because firms will only seek innovations where a problem such as lack of
profitability or malfunctioning of machines is present);.
52 NELSON & WINTER, supra, n. __, at 211 (assuming that firms are “satificers” rather than optimizers, and thus will
do no searching for innovations at all if the firms are sufficiently profitable). Nelson and Winter’s “dumb manager”
assumption has been criticized by some as being unrealistic. Vernon W. Ruttan, Sources of Technical Change:
Induced Innovation, Evolutionary Theory, and Path Dependence, in TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 9, 19 (Arnulf Grubler, et al.eds. 2002) .
53 Malloy, Incentives, supra, n. __, at 538.
54 Id. at 571-586.
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Influence of Existing Regulation

A concrete example is helpful in understanding the potential impact of
regulation on diffusion.

Assume that Environmental Solutions, Inc. (“ESI”) has

developed a new, commercially viable pollution control system for capturing and
treating hydrogen sulfide emissions from petroleum refinery process units. Unlike
existing technologies that use thermal oxidizers, the ESI technology uses a chemical
process to treat the hydrogen sulfide.

The ESI technology appears to perform as

well as or better than the existing technology at a lower cost. Assume also that
federal environmental regulation of the process units limits hydrogen sulfide
emissions from such facilities. How will that regulation affect the diffusion of the
ESI technology?

At the most basic level, the “induced innovation hypothesis” tells us that the
hydrogen sulfide regulations should lead to the diffusion of at least some form of
environmental technology.

That hypothesis posits that an increase in the relative

prices of factors of production will stimulate innovation directed at economizing the
use of those now more expensive factors.55 Because it increases the cost of emitting
pollution, regulation has the same effect as an increase in factor prices.56 In our
example, faced with regulation, petroleum refineries will seek the most cost effective
strategy for reducing hydrogen sulfide emissions, creating a demand for the ESI
technology and resulting in its diffusion.57

HICKS, THE THEORY OF WAGES 124-125 (2ND ED. 1963); Ruttan, supra, n. __, at 11.
G. Newell, et al., The Induced Innovation Hypothesis and Energy Saving Technological Change, 114 The
Quarterly J. Econ. 941, ___ (1999); Malloy, Incentives, supra, n. __, at 546.
57 Rational choice principles suggest that the firm will identify a number of control alternatives, including: (1) using
mature technology (such as a thermal oxidizer) to control emissions, (2) using innovative pollution control
technology, or (3) modifying the process itself so as to reduce or prevent emissions in the first place. Based on its
decision criteria, the organization will then evaluate the alternatives. Malloy, Incentives, supra, n. __, at 546, n.51.
Obviously, firms with existing controls already in place would also take into account the switching costs into account
55 JOHN

56Richard

19

INNOVATION, REGULATION AND THE SELECTION ENVIRONMENT

But this application of the induced innovation hypothesis is too simplistic.
Ultimately the actual impact of any given regulation on innovation depends in large
part on two separate aspects of the regulation: its basic structure and the manner in
which it is implemented.58 Much of the existing literature focuses on the first aspect.
While recognizing the importance of regulatory form, we seek to direct attention to
the second aspect as well.

1.

Regulatory Structure

Generally speaking, a regulation can be structured as either a “design
standard” or a “performance standard.”

A design standard mandates the use of a

particular pollution control technology.59 Thus, if the hydrogen sulfide regulation
requires the capture and subsequent treatment of hydrogen sulfide emissions with a
thermal oxidizer having a destruction efficiency of 98 percent, that regulation would
be a design standard. While such a standard would likely lead to broad diffusion of
the thermal oxidizer technology, it would severely limit the diffusion of alternative
pollution control technologies exhibiting equivalent or superior performance, such as
the ESI technology.60 In other words, the design standard essentially “locks-in” the
existing technology, and requires specific, formal action by the regulator before
alternative technologies can be used.

in evaluating the benefits of the ESI technology. Of course, the effects of the regulation may also be limited by other
factors in the selection environment, such as inadequate information flow or boundedly rational search routines.)
58 Of course, the stringency of the regulation is also an important factor. A weak regulation that calls for little
improvement in environmental performance is unlikely to encourage significant innovation or diffusion.
59 Malloy, Incentives, supra, n. __, at 546, n.50; Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Marketable Permits: Lessons
for Theory and Practice, 16 ECO. L. Q. 361, 361 (1989).
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However, although a design standard can impair the diffusion of alternative

pollution control technologies, it could still play a meaningful role in the diffusion of
innovative process changes that prevent rather than control pollution. Suppose that
the ESI technology actually involved modifications to the standard process units at
the refinery so as to prevent the formation of hydrogen sulfide in the first instance.
In that case, the hydrogen sulfide regulation is not a barrier to the use of the ESI
technology because units using the ESI technology would no longer be subject to the
regulation. The very fact that adoption of the ESI technology avoids the application
of the hydrogen sulfide regulation theoretically provides an impetus for the diffusion
of that technology.

In contrast to a design standard, a performance standard specifies a desired
result in terms of an emission limit or other objective goal, but leaves it to the firm
to select the technology needed to achieve that result.61 In our example, a regulation
that limits hydrogen sulfide emissions to a concentration of no more than 10 parts
per million in the exhaust gas stream constitutes a performance standard.
Alternatively, as is often done in permitting for new sources, the firm may be
required to achieve the same level of control as is reached by the best available
control technology.62

Under the induced innovation hypothesis, performance

standards should encourage diffusion by providing the both the demand for
innovation and the flexibility to use alternative technologies.63

60 See, e.g., Byron Swift, Barriers to Environmental Technology and Use, 28 ENVTL. L. REP. 10202, 10213 (1998);
Stewart, Conceptual Framework, supra, n. __, at 1281-82.
61 Smith, supra, n. __, at _____; Stewart, Conceptual Framework, supra, n. __, at 1263-69.
62 See 42 U.S.C.A. Section 7503(a)(2) (requiring attainment of lowest achievable emission rate in certain areas
under New Source Review).
63 David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive Program?: Replacing the Command and
Control/Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 289, 302 (1998). Nonetheless, even some types of
performance standards can limit the diffusion of innovations in production processes. For example, some
performance standards are written so as to require either (a) a specific percent reduction in pollutant mass as
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2.

Regulatory Implementation

Although the structure of a regulation significantly affects its influence on
diffusion, the manner in which the regulation is implemented is also a critical factor
in course of diffusion. Implementation of regulatory programs can limit diffusion in
at least two noteworthy ways. First, even ostensibly flexible performance standards
can be implemented conservatively, and thus transformed into something akin to
design standards. For example, critics of traditional regulation often contend that
new source review permitting programs, which in theory should allow firms to select
any technology that provides the same performance as the best available control
technology, in practice are implemented in an excessively rigid manner. They argue
that permitting officials are biased in favor of conventional technologies due to the
officials' unfamiliarity with new technology, lack of resources, and distrust of the
regulated community.64

Consequently, it is argued, permitting officials are very

reluctant to approve the use of new technologies as part of the permitting process.65

compared to an uncontrolled emission or (b) a specific reduction in the concentration of the pollutant at the “end of
the pipe.” Because they focus on the effectiveness of controlling pollution after it has been generated, such limits do
not recognize the impact of pollution prevention measures that reduce the mass of pollution that would otherwise
occur. Suppose that an emission limit required a 90% reduction in pollutant mass emitted from a process unit. A
“pollution prevention” measure that prevented 95% of the pollution from ever being created would not meet the limit
because there would be no control (i.e., no 90% reduction) of the remaining 5% of pollution that is created and
emitted. See ELI, PERSPECTIVES, supra, n. __, at 10-12. Of course, this assumes that the emission limits
incorporate only a single format, such as a percent reduction requirement. In fact, many regulations include
alternative formats, including some that take account of process and raw material changes that reduce the mass of
pollution generated.
64 Swift, supra, n. __, at 10208-09; NACEPT, BARRIERS, supra, n. __, at 10-11.
65 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, BARRIERS TO ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGY Innovation AND USE 17-19 (1998)
(hereinafter “BARRIERS”); Kurt A. Strasser, Cleaner Technology, Pollution Prevention and Environmental
Regulation, 9 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. J. 57, __-__ (1997); U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PERMITTING AND
COMPLIANCE POLICY: BARRIERS TO U. S. ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION 32 (EPA 101/N-91/001 1991).
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Second, the intensity of enforcement can affect the strength of the incentives

created by regulation for adopting innovative technologies.66 When enforcement is
lax, inspections are infrequent and penalties low, many firms may perceive less
pressure to devote attention and resources to compliance. Accordingly, the actual
costs of compliance are quite low, and thus have less influence on diffusion.

Before evaluating how the selection environment as outlined may affect the
diffusion of wet cleaning, we must understand the nature of the garment care sector,
including the professional cleaners, the technology vendors, and the regulatory
agency. Section III provides that background.

III. The Garment Care Sector

A.

The Competing Technologies: "Dry" and 'Wet" Cleaning Systems
Like penicillin and the dynamite, dry cleaning was discovered by accident. In

the early nineteenth century, Jean Baptiste Jolly noticed that some spilled kerosene
dissolved a stain on his tablecloth.67 This observation led to the development of
modern “dry cleaning” technology, a process in which a solvent other than water-usually PCE or a petroleum-based solvent-- is used to clean garments.68 PCE and
petroleum dry cleaning processes are very similar to the process that most of us use
in washing and drying clothes at home, except that clothes are washed in the dry

66 KEMP, supra, n. __, at 103 (noting that in the case of traditional regulation, diffusion will depend upon, among
other things, “the law enforcement processes, penalties for legal violations, and the law-abiding nature of people and
organizations that are subject to environmental laws.”)
67 CHARLOTTE FOLTZ JONES, ACCIDENTS MAY HAPPEN ___ (1996). For a brief history of the garment care industry
dating back to 1707, see Kimberly M. Thompson, Cleaning Up Dry Cleaners, in THE GREENING OF INDUSTRY 93, 9498 (John D. Graham and Jennifer Kassalow Hartwell eds. 1997).
68 See United States Environmental Protection Agency (“USEPA”), EPA Office of Compliance Sector Notebook Project
Profile of the Dry Cleaning Industry 3-4 (EPA/310-R-95-001 1995) (“SECTOR NOTEBOOK”)(defining professional dry
cleaning).
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cleaning solvent rather than in water.69 In the past, the drying cycle was conducted
in a separate machine, causing significant solvent emissions when the clothes were
transferred between the machines. Modern “closed loop” machines perform both
functions in one machine, and include solvent recovery systems designed to reduce
solvent emissions.70
Dry cleaning operations expose humans and the environment to PCE through
spills and releases of PCE and PCE-contaminated wastes to air, soil, groundwater
and surface water.71 PCE vapors reach the air inside and outside of the cleaning
facility from process vents and leaks.72

In a comprehensive study of toxic air

emissions in the Los Angeles air basin, AQMD found that dry cleaners were the
leading contributors of PCE emissions.73

This is particularly significant because

PCE is classified by as a probable human carcinogen by the International Agency for
Research on Cancer and as a potential human carcinogen by the National Institute
of Occupational Safety & Health. Petroleum dry cleaning also causes air emissions.
Although petroleum solvents are not classified as carcinogens, they do contribute to
the formation of ground level ozone (more commonly known as smog).
In the early 1990's, equipment manufacturers developed professional wet
cleaning systems consisting of computer-controlled washers and dryers, specially

69 EPA, SECTOR Notebook, supra, n. __, at 3; Due to the higher flammability of petroleum solvents, petroleum
machines are also equipped with fire suppressant systems. Some petroleum systems inject an inert gas, such as
nitrogen or argon, to reduce oxygen concentration. Other systems use a vacuum system during the operating of the
equipment to reduce oxygen concentrations.
70 Id. at ___; SCAQMD, Staff Report, supra n. __, at 1-1.
71 USEPA, Sector Notebook, at 24-25.
72 Id..
73 SCAQMD, MULTIPLE AIR TOXICS EXPOSURE STUDY IN THE SOUTH COAST BASIN (March 2000).
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formulated detergents, and finishing equipment to create a cost-effective alternative
to dry cleaning.74 Wet cleaning systems use water as a cleaning solvent rather than
PCE or petroleum-based solvents.

Researchers have performed numerous case

studies of professional wet cleaning at commercial facilities, focusing on the process'
technical performance, economic sustainability, and environmental impacts.75

In

terms of technical performance, professional wet cleaners were able to successfully
clean the full range of garments normally taken to a dry cleaner.

76

Moreover, wet

cleaning operations generated a high level of customer satisfaction.77 With respect to
economic performance, the capital cost for professional wet cleaning equipment was
lower than that of dry cleaning equipment, while overall operating expenses were
comparable to or even less than those of dry cleaning operations.

78

In terms of

environmental impact, no environmental concerns were identified, and a substantial
benefit is produced through the elimination of PCE.79

B.

The Garment Care Industry Actors
1.

The Cleaners

74 USEPA, Cleaner Technologies Substitutes Assessment: Professional Fabricare Processes 2-13 TO 2-24 (EPA 744-B98-001 1998) (hereinafter “Substitutes Assessment”).
75 Sinsheimer, et al., COMMERCIALIZATION OF PROFESSIONAL WET CLEANING: AN EVALUATION OF OPPORTUNITIES
AND FACTORS INVOLVED IN SWITCHING TO A POLLUTION PREVENTION TECHNOLOGY IN THE GARMENT CARE INDUSTRY
(2002); ANTHONY STAR AND SYLVIA EWING, REAL WORLD WET CLEANING: A STUDY OF THREE ESTABLISHED WET
CLEANING SHOPS CNT 2002) (investigating technical and financial performance at three wet cleaning shops);
POLLUTION PREVENTION, EDUCATION AND RESEARCH CENTER (PPERC), POLLUTION PREVENTION IN THE GARMENT
CARE INDUSTRY: ASSESSING THE VIABILITY OF PROFESSIONAL WET CLEANING (1997)(investigating technical
performance, financial performance and environmental impact of start-up wet cleaner); PETER SINSHEIMER AND
ROBERT GOTTLIEB, SUPPORTING POLLUTION PREVENTION IN THE GARMENT CARE INDUSTRY (2000) (nvestigating
technical performance and financial performance wet cleaner that converted from dry cleaning technology); JO
PATTON AND WILLIAM EYRING, ALTERNATIVE CLOTHES CLEANING DEMONSTRATION SHOP FINAL REPORT (1996)
(investigating technical performance and environmental impact of start-up wet cleaner); ENVIRONMENT CANADA,
FINAL REPORT FOR THE GREEN CLEAN PROJECT (1995)(investigating technical performance and environmental
impact of start-up wet cleaner).
76 SINSHEIMER, et al., supra, n. __, at 4-6 to 4-8
77 SINSHEIMER, et al., supra, n. __, at 3-1 to 3-22 (assessing customer satisfaction at five wet cleaning facilities);
SINSHEIMER & GOTTLIEB, supra, n. __, at 2-1 to 2-4 (assessing customer satisfaction at one wet cleaning facility).
78 SINSHEIMER & GOTTLIEB, supra, n. __, at 4-9 to 4-13.
79 PPERC, supra, n. __ at 5-1 to 5-31.
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Currently in the United States, 85% of professional cleaners use PCE as their
primary cleaning solvent, while approximately 15% of cleaners use petroleum-based
solvents.80

Although wet cleaning is widely used in Germany, diffusion of wet

cleaning in the United States has been slow.81

There are approximately 38

dedicated wet cleaners across the nation; that is, shops using wet cleaning as their
sole cleaning technology.82 As of 2002, Southern California had ten "dedicated" wet
cleaners.83
The professional cleaning industry is a highly decentralized sector. There are
approximately 36,000 dry cleaning shops nationwide, generating approximately $7.2
billion in revenues each year.84 Of these, approximately 2,618 operate in California.85
The vast majority of cleaners in the United States and California are very small
neighborhood businesses at which cleaning and finishing are performed on the
premises.

Although the sizes of drycleaners vary, the majority of professional dry

cleaners are single facility, family-owned businesses.86 A typical “mom and pop”
shop may have two or three full time employees (including the owner) and often
additional part-time help. Most cleaners have fewer than 10 employees and report
gross revenues of less than $113,000.87 Revenues must cover labor costs, rent, debt

USEPA, Substitutes Assessment, supra, n. __, at 2-17.
SCAQMD, Staff Report, at 1-18 to 1-19.
82 USEPA, Design for the Environment Wetcleaning Directory (EPA 744-B-99-002 1999).
83 SCAQMD, Staff Report, supra, n. __, at __.
84United States Census Bureau, 1997 Economic Census (1999).
85 Id. at Table 1a.
86 http://www.ifi.org/industry/industry-profile.html (visited December 2, 2002).
87 USEPA, Sector Notebook, at 5-6 (1995).
80
81
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service equipment, regulatory costs, solvents and supplies. Although labor costs are
the largest cost category, wages are typically quite low.88
2.

The Manufacturers and Distributors

To understand the market structure for equipment and supply vendors in the
garment care sector, one must first identify the types of equipment that professional
cleaners actually use in their process. Dry cleaners typically have two types of
cleaning machines: commercial laundry machines (used for cotton shirts, linens and
similar garments) and dry cleaning machines (used for other garments that typically
carry a “dry clean” label). The two types of cleaning machines are manufactured by
two different sets of companies, and distributed by yet a third set (with some limited
overlap).
Given the fact that the garment care industry is dominated by PCE dry
cleaners, it is unsurprising that manufacturers of PCE dry cleaning systems produce
most of the dominate the garment care equipment sector. As new petroleum-based
solvents and silicone-based solvents have emerged, those manufacturers have
modified their equipment designs to create machines capable of using these newer
solvents.89

Interestingly, none of the PCE machine manufacturers have developed

wet cleaning systems. Rather, the laundry machine manufacturers have taken the
lead in wet cleaning technology.
In 1991, Meile, Inc., a German appliance manufacturer, introduced the wet
cleaning technology as an alternative to dry cleaning.90

Currently, wet cleaning

systems are produced by manufacturers of industrial and domestic laundry systems
– including Miele of Germany, Electrolux of Sweden and Denmark (manufacturer of

88
89

Id.at 5.
Personal interview with James Douglas (April 2001.)
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the Aqua Clean system), and IPSO of Belgium (manufacturer of Aquatex system).

91

The two wet cleaning system manufacturers in United States, Alliance Laundry
Systems (using the brand name Unimac) and Pellerin Milnor Corporation) are
leading industrial laundry equipment manufacturers.92 With the exception of Miele
(which manufactures a wide range of consumer appliances and industrial equipment
such as vacuum cleaners, ovens, and parts cleaning systems), the vast majority of
equipment sales for each of these firms are of industrial laundry systems.93
Six companies currently distribute wet cleaning systems in the United
States.94

Each of these companies also either manufactures or distributes other

types of cleaning equipment. For example, Wascomat, the exclusive United States
distributor of Aqua Clean wet cleaning systems, claims to be the world's largest
manufacturer of industrial laundry equipment.95

Likewise, Bowe Permac, a

distributor of Swiss-made Schulthess wet cleaning systems, manufactures and sells
PCE, petroleum and silicone systems.96

Cite to http://www.miele.com/aboutmiele.html; SINSHEIMER, ET AL., supra, n. __, at 1-3, n.1.
Center for Neighborhood Technology (“CNT”), Wet Cleaning Equipment Report (May 1997);
http://www.miele.com/aboutmiele.html; Diane Ritchey, Success in Sweden, 58 APPLIANCE __, __ (February 1, 2001)
(discussing Electrolux’ role as a world leader in commercial laundry systems). Production of the Aquatex system is
actually spread among three companies. While IPSO manufactures the washer, American Dryer produces the dryer
in the United States, and Evapoform manufactures the drying cabinet in England. Id.
92 See, e.g., Business Wire, Alliance Laundry Systems Withdraws Initial Public Offering of Trust Units and
Terminates Offer to Purchase (November 14, 2002); http://www.milnor.com/products0c.asp (visited December 3,
2002); infoUSA.com, US Business Directory, Peelerin Milnor Corp. (November 6, 2002).
93 Timothy F. Malloy and Peter Sinsheimer, Pollution Prevention as a Regulatory Tool in California: Breaking
Barriers and Building Bridges, in POLICY OPTIONS 2002 85-86 (Daniel Mitchell ed. 2002) (citing interviews with
Daniel Goldman of Wascomat and Robert Eisenberg of IPSO).
94 See CNT, supra, n. __, at __-__; Malloy & Sinsheimer, supra, n. __, at 85.
95 http://www.wascomat.com/whoweare.htm (visited December 3, 2002).
96 Malloy & Sinsheimer, supra, n. __, at 85 (citing interview with Tom Tipps of Bowe Permac Garment Care
Systems); see http://www.bowe-tc.com/products/products.html (visited December 3, 2002); http://www.bowetc.com/products/WetCleaningSystems.html (visited December 3, 2002).
90
91
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The Regulator
This case study focuses on rules and activity of the South Coast Air Quality

Management District (“AQMD”), the major air regulator of dry cleaners in Southern
California.97 Covering all of Los Angeles and Orange Counties (and parts of several
other counties), it is directed by a Governing Board with support of a large
professional staff.

Much of AQMD’s work is directed at establishing and

implementing rules that govern the type and amount of air emissions that can be
released by sources in the region.

The rules are typically incorporated into

operating permits issued by AQMD, and enforced by its inspectors and prosecutors.
AQMD also plays a role in technology advancement, funding research intended to
encourage the development and adoption of new pollution management technologies.
AQMD’s operating divisions are primarily organized on a functional basis.
Thus, the Planning, Rule Development, and Area Sources division is responsible for
drafting new rules and rule amendments.

Likewise, various offices within the

Engineering and Compliance division are charged with implementation of rules,
whether through issuance of permits or enforcement of rules and existing permits.
Legal functions are split between the District Prosecutor’s office and the General
Counsel’s

office,

which

handle

enforcement

and

non-enforcement

matters,

respectively. The Science and Technology Advancement office (“TAO”) assists in the
development and demonstration of new technologies. AQMD established TAO in
1988 in response to air quality in the Los Angeles air basin that was so bad that new

97 The dry cleaning industry is regulated by a variety of local, state and federal agencies under a number of
environmental and public safety programs. In terms of impact on the selection of dry cleaning equipment and
solvent, air quality regulations have generally played the most significant role of all. Both petroleum and PCE dry
cleaning are regulated under federal, state and local rules in California and many other states. See SCAQMD, Staff
Report, supra n. __, at 1-1 to 1-5 (describing history of regulation of dry cleaning under California air quality laws;
40 C.F.R. Part 63, subpart M (200_) (regulation of PCE dry cleaning under the federal National Emission Standard
for Hazardous Air Pollutant program); 40 C.F.R. Part 60, subpart JJJ (regulation of petroleum dry cleaning under
the federal New Source Performance Standard program).
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emission reduction technologies would be needed to attain federal standards.98 From
1995 to the present, TAO has played a significant role in supporting studies of the
viability and commercialization of wet cleaning.99

IV.

Diffusion in the Garment Care Industry

This section tackles the question of why wet cleaning has diffused so slowly
over the past decade. In doing so, it focuses upon the selection environment as it
existed prior to December 2002, the month in which AQMD changed the regulations
governing PCE dry cleaning.

In that pre-December 2002 period, the AQMD

regulations generally resembled those of most jurisdictions: cleaners were permitted
to use PCE dry cleaning equipment, so long as the cleaners used certain types of
control equipment and followed specific operation, maintenance and inspection
practices.

Our analysis identified two primary barriers to diffusion, which we

summarize here and discuss in greater detail below.
First, dry cleaners exhibit high levels of concern and misinformation
concerning wet cleaning that are not overcome by the perceived benefits of the new
technology.

From the cleaner's perspective, the major perceived benefit of wet

cleaning—reduced toxic pollution—accrues to workers or the general public rather
than to the cleaner.

The economic value of other benefits (such as reduced

regulation and lower capital costs) does not appear large enough to overcome the

Personal interview with Chung Lui, Director of TAO ( 2001.)
TAO has assisted in the funding of (1) the first professional wet cleaning demonstration facility in California, (2)
a technical assistance project designed to educate cleaners in the South Coast region about professional wet
cleaning, and (3) a grant program to assist eight dry cleaners interested in switching to professional wet cleaning.
SINSHEIMER, ET AL., supra, n. __, at 1-1 to 1-5.
98
99

30

INNOVATION, REGULATION AND THE SELECTION ENVIRONMENT

perceived risk of failure and cost of learning a new technology. Given these concerns
and the cleaners’ general satisfaction with traditional technology, diffusion of wet
cleaning will remain slow unless supported by an external incentive of some form.
Second, there is little evidence that either vendors of wet cleaning equipment
or previously existing government regulation would provide that external influence.
Given the structure of the market for professional cleaning equipment, most vendors
have no strong economic incentive to encourage the diffusion of wet cleaning.
Moreover,

information

barriers,

resource

constraints

and

other

internal

organizational obstacles prevented government permitting and enforcement
activities from having any observable growth in wet cleaning.

Ultimately, our

analysis of the pre-existing selection environment concludes that, absent some new
external influence, broad diffusion of wet cleaning technology would not occur in the
foreseeable future.

A.

Information Flow in the Sector
Emphasis on information flow has significant traction in the context of the

dry cleaning sector.

On the surface, one might assume that dry cleaners were

knowledgeable about wet cleaning technology.

Indeed, seventy-five percent

cleaners surveyed stated they were either very familiar or somewhat familiar with
wet cleaning.100 However, it appears that cleaners’ perceived familiarity with wet
cleaning—whatever the level—did not reflect their actual knowledge about the
technology.

Our survey of dry cleaners in the Los Angeles area concerning

100 Out of all respondents, 21% were very familiar with wet cleaning while 54% were somewhat familiar with it.
Ninety-three percent of respondents were very familiar with PCE machines.
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technology choice indicates that most dry cleaners lacked meaningful, accurate
information about wet cleaning.
For example, 74% of the cleaners who considered themselves familiar with
wet cleaning believed that wet cleaning causes permanent harm to garments. Yet, it
is clear from numerous studies of operating wet cleaning shops that wet cleaning
systems using tensioning systems cause no greater damage to garments than the
traditional dry cleaning process.101 This widely held fear of damage to garments is
likely a substantial barrier to diffusion; it was identified by the majority of cleaners
in the survey as their major concern about wet cleaning.
Nor is misinformation limited to this one issue.

For example, fifty-four

percent of cleaners who identified themselves as being “very familiar” with wet
cleaning believed that a shop that shifts to wet cleaning would lose many customers.
Obviously, concern over the loss of customer base would be a critical factor in
technology choice for any business. Yet, this concern also appears to be unfounded.
Every empirical study of commercial wet cleaning has documented high customer
retention rates following a shift to wet cleaning.102 In fact, one recent study of five
wet cleaning facilities reported customer retention rates of between 99 and 100%,
with two shops increasing their customer base by 4% or more by attracting
customers interested in using non-toxic alternative cleaning systems.103

SINSHEIMER, ET AL., supra, n. __, at 4-6 to 4-9; STAR & EWING, supra, n. __, at 17; PPERC, supra, n. __, at 3-1 to
3-48;.
102 See, e.g., STAR & EWING, supra, n. __, at 17; PPERC, supra, n. __, at 3-33; SINSHEIMER, ET AL., supra, n. __, at 4-7
to 4-8.
103 SINSHEIMER, ET AL., supra, n. __, at 4-8.
101
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Clearly, most dry cleaners lack accurate information regarding dry cleaning

technology. To some extent, their misconceptions may simply result from out-of-date
information.

For example, until the introduction of specialized tensioning

equipment in the mid-1990’s, concerns over shrinkage of clothes did prevent the
efficient handling of certain categories of garments. While shrinkage is no longer a
problem in wet cleaning, most dry cleaners continue to believe otherwise. Even if
these this misconception is based on stale information, the question remains as to
why the cleaners are not aware of the more current, accurate information. We can
uncover at least part of the answer by examining the most salient source of
information within the sector—vendors of wet cleaning equipment itself.
Vendors are in a strong position to influence technology choice among
professional cleaners.

Fifty-one percent of the cleaners surveyed considered

equipment suppliers to be a very important source of information about cleaning
technology.

One might expect that wet cleaning vendors have strong financial

incentive to ensure that their products are marketed to dry cleaners aggressively,
yet there is little evidence of such activity.104

In part, this passive marketing

behavior may result from the relatively minor importance of wet cleaning equipment
sales within the manufacturing companies.

In most of these companies, the

production of industrial and laundry systems dwarfs the production of wet cleaning
equipment in terms of volume and importance to the company.105 Indeed, only Miele,
a German company without a strong presence in the United States market, relies
upon wet cleaning systems for the majority of its sales of professional cleaning

104 It appears that this phenomenon is not limited to the garment care sector. See KEMP, supra, n. __, at 237
(describing case study of plating industry which concluded that vendors of new pollution control technology found
the sector to be “difficult” and directed their efforts to other more profitable markets.)
105 Malloy & Sinsheimer, supra, n. __, at 85.
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machines.106 And even in Miele’s case, professional cleaning equipment is but one of
a large and diverse set of product lines manufactured by the firm.
Turning to distributors of wet cleaning equipment, we find similar potential
barriers to aggressive marketing where the firms distribute more than one type of
cleaning system (for example, selling both laundry equipment and dry cleaning
systems). Consider Bowe Permac, which manufactures its own PCE and petroleum
dry cleaning systems and distributes wet cleaning systems manufactured by
Schulthess in Switzerland. The vast majority of Bowe Permac’s equipment sales are
of its dry cleaning systems.107 Bowe Permac’s sales agents are paid on commission,
and are therefore more motivated to sell dry cleaning systems because such systems
are both more expensive and (given the bias against wet cleaning within the sector)
easier to sell than wet cleaning systems.108 Likewise, among firms distributing both
wet cleaning systems and commercial laundry equipment, only Wascomat (the U.S.
distributor of Aqua Clean equipment) actively promotes the wet cleaning system.109
Yet even Wascomat promotes its wet cleaning equipment as a "supplement" to dry
cleaning, selling the majority of its Aqua Clean system to "mixed" shops that have
both wet and dry cleaning machines.110

Thus, generally speaking, wet cleaning

equipment vendors appear to be weak vehicles for information dissemination.

Id. at 85 (citing interview with Jurgen Shaeffer of Miele).
Id.. (citing interview with Tom Tipps of Bowe Permac).
108 Id. 86; see KEMP, supra, n. __, at 99, n.1 (suggesting that sales people may advise against the purchase of a clean
technology and advocate a product with a higher profit margin).
109 Malloy and Sinsheimer, supra, n. __, . at 86 (citing Daniel Goldman of Wascomat).
110 Id.
106
107
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Perceived Costs and Benefits of Wet Cleaning Technology
At first blush, wet cleaning technology appears to offer significant benefits to

dry cleaners at little cost. Two benefits dominate most discussions of the technology:
comparable performance at less cost and decreased exposure to a hazardous
chemical.111 However, when viewed from the perspective of many cleaners, these
benefits are either illusory or irrelevant. It appears that for many cleaners, the
perceived risk of failure and costs of learning the new technology appear to outweigh
whatever value the cleaners may place on the putative benefits of switching.
We begin with the issue of cost savings associated with wet cleaning. All
other things being equal, there is little doubt that the capital and operating costs of
a wet cleaning system are less than those of a comparable dry cleaning system.112
For example, a 40 pound wet cleaning washer, 75-pound dryer and finishing
equipment cost about $35,000. A comparably sized PCE machine ranges in price
from $41,000 to $47,000. Overall, operating costs for wet cleaning facilities are
comparable to or lower than those for dry cleaning.113 A recent study of professional
cleaners who had switched from PCE dry cleaning to wet cleaning compared three
shops’ operating costs before and after the conversion.

That study found that

operating costs per 100 clothes cleaned dropped at all three shops by between 17 and
50 percent after the conversion.114
Yet for a majority of the cleaners,’ cost differences of this magnitude would
not make a switch to wet cleaning more likely. When asked about cost savings
associated with wet cleaning, only 8 percent of the cleaners responded that the cost

111 Freedom from pervasive regulation is also sometimes mentioned as a major benefit of wet cleaning. We believe
that this factor is captured by the cost reductions.
112 This assumes that the systems are of similar capacity and quality. For example, a small, lower end PCE dry
cleaning system could cost less than a large, high end wet cleaning system.
113 AQMD, Staff Report, supra, n. __, at 1-25.
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differential made them much more likely to purchase a wet cleaning system.115 This
apparent indifference to marginal cost differences is consistent with the responses
received when cleaners were asked about the impact of purchase price rebates on
their technology choice. As we discuss in more detail in Section IV, it appears that
even relatively large financial incentives on the order of $10,000 to $17,500 would
not cause most cleaners to shift from PCE dry cleaning to wet cleaning.116
Moreover, based on information available to them in the selection
environment, the cleaners may simply not believe that the cost savings will occur, or
may believe that the technology will not perform as well as PCE dry cleaning. In
public testimony before the United States Congress and in public hearings before
AQMD, the garment care industry trade associations and individual cleaners
consistently took the position that wet cleaning is both more expensive and less
effective than dry cleaning.117 As discussed with respect to information flow within
the sector, most cleaners rely on the trade associations and other cleaners for their
information concerning cleaning technologies.
In addition, individual cleaners may perceive other costs of switching to be
higher. The shift to wet cleaning requires that a cleaner learn a new technology,
resulting in some training costs and efforts and, perhaps more importantly, giving
rise to concern on the part of the cleaner that he or she may not be able to master

Sinsheimer, et al., supra, n. __, at 4-11.
Another 23 percent of the cleaners responded that the lower cost would make them somewhat more likely to buy
wet cleaning equipment.
116 See text accompanying notes __-__.
117 See, e.g., SCAQMD, Staff Report, App. A, A-3, A-7, A-8, A-20, A-34, A-44, and A-47 (Comments 2,10, 18, 45(e), 27,
53, 61, respectively).
114
115
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the new technology. PCE is an aggressive solvent, able to remove many spots and
stains without requiring significant skill or knowledge on the part of the operator.118
Wet cleaning calls for more attention to the nature of various types of stains and
techniques for their removal, and entails more technical skill in the operation of the
cleaning equipment.119 Although it is difficult to quantify the economic impact of this
concern, it does appear that the effort and risk associated with learning how to wet
clean acts limits the willingness to switch of at least some cleaners.120
The second major benefit of conversion to wet cleaning is the prevention of
exposure to PCE among shop owners, employees and the general public. AQMD
estimates that even new dry cleaning machines with state of the art emissions
controls will emit an average of 50% of the PCE used in the machines, resulting in
excess cancer risks in a range from 15 to 90 in a million to residents and workers in
nearby areas.121 Other studies have documented significant health risks faced by
nearby residents and dry cleaning shop employees.122 Nonetheless, the public health
benefits of converting to wet cleaning fare little better than the cost benefits in
encouraging cleaners to switch from dry cleaning.

The majority of cleaners

responding to our survey did not view PCE exposure as a serious problem for their
business,123 and presumably would not view reduced PCE emissions to be cause for
converting.

Interview with James Douglas by authors (April 2001).
Kenny Slatten, _______, WESTERN CLEANER AND LAUNDERER, __-__ (MARCH 2002)(observing that PCE has spoiled
cleaners and that “[n]ow is the time to become better educated in your craft.”)
120 In a prior study, two out of five dry cleaners who ultimately converted to wetcleaning reported that the difficulty
of learning a new technology was a major concern prior to converting. Sinsheimer, et al., supra, n. __, at 3-8 and 312.
121 AQMD, Staff Report, supra, n. __, at 1-8.
122 Gary Garetano & Michael Gochfeld, Factors Influencing Tetrachloroethylene Concentrations in Residences Above
Dry Cleaning Establishments, 55 ARCHIVES OF ENVT'L HEALTH 59 (2000); Wan-Kuen Jo & Sung-Hwan Kim, Worker
Exposure to Aromatic Volatile Compounds in Dry Cleaning Stores, 62 AMER. INDUSTRIAL HYGIENE ASSOC. J. 466
(2001).
123 In our survey, 55% of respondents stated that the hazardous nature of chemicals used in dry cleaning was not a
serious problem for their business. Only 14% of the cleaners found the use of hazardous chemicals to be a very
118
119

37

INNOVATION, REGULATION AND THE SELECTION ENVIRONMENT

Several factors also appear to contribute to the stickiness of the cleaners’
preference for PCE. With respect to reductions PCE exposure, it appears that many
PCE dry cleaners are simply not convinced that PCE is not a significant health
threat. The International Fabricare Institute ("IFI"), the major garment care trade
association, contends that PCE poses no demonstrable cancer risk.124 Cleaners are
more likely rely upon the IFI rather than EPA or AQMD for information on this
point. Moreover, cleaners using PCE may be more likely to view the chemical as
harmless as a result of certain cognitive phenomena. For example, many cleaners
rely upon personal experience in arguing that PCE does not cause cancer, pointing
to the lack of cancer in their family or among their peer group.125

Cognitive

psychologists have demonstrated the tendency of individuals to allow such local,
anecdotal evidence to bias judgments concerning the probability or frequency of
conditions or events occurring in a broader population.126 Likewise, given the fact
the PCE dry cleaner’s technology choice exposes the cleaner, his or her employees,

serious problem, while 28% viewed it as a somewhat serious problem. Three percent of the cleaners have no opinion
on the matter.
124 Cite AQMD testimony; http://www.ifi.org/industry/industry-profile.html (visited December 2, 2002). The question
of whether PCE causes cancer has sparked controversy for decades. For an overview of the scientific issues and the
history of the regulatory battles over the designation of PCE as a probable carcinogen, see Thompson, supra, n. __,
at 102-128. Ultimately, for purposes of understanding the diffusion of wet cleaning, whether PCE actually causes
cancer or should be classified as such is less important than question of how the cleaners view the chemical and its
health impacts.
125 We attended a number of meetings during the SCAQMD rulemaking procedure at which individual dry cleaners
noted that neither they nor their families or workers had experienced cancers or other harms from perc exposure.
126 See, e.g., MAX BAZERMAN, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING 18-19 (1998) (describing the impact of
the availability heuristic and the “presumed association” bias on judgment of the likelihood of two events occurring
together).
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family, customers and neighbors to the solvent, the mechanism of cognitive
dissonance may encourage cleaners to discount the risks of PCE use.127

C.

Effect of Regulation
Two AQMD rules are particularly relevant to the dry cleaning sector. The

first is Rule 1421, a source-specific rule that applies expressly to all existing and
new dry cleaning operations using PCE. (As discussed in Part V, Rule 1421 was
amended in December 2002 to prohibit the use of PCE dry cleaning after 2020. In
this section, we refer to Rule 1421 as it existed prior to December 2002.) The second
is Rule 1401, a permitting provision covering new sources of toxic air contaminants
that essentially requires new PCE dry cleaners to use “state of the art” emission
controls.

Neither Rule 1421 nor Rule 1401 expressly or functionally restricts

professional cleaners from adopting wet cleaning systems.

Instead, these rules

reflect lost opportunities for diffusion rather than affirmative barriers to it. For
although in theory each of these rules could encourage the diffusion of wet cleaning
by increasing the costs of dry cleaning, in practice they have had no such effect. The
following discussion examines several likely causes for the gap between theory and
reality in this context.

1.

Enforcement of the Source-Specific Rule

Rule 1421 sets forth design and performance standards for PCE dry cleaning
machines, and supersedes both state and federal rules applicable to PCE dry

127 See COGNITIVE DISSONANCE : PROGRESS ON A PIVOTAL THEORY IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, Eddie Harmon-Jones &
Judson Mills, eds. (1999).
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cleaning.128 It essentially requires that cleaners use particular types of PCE dry
cleaning machines equipped with specified emissions controls.129

Rule 1421 also

includes training, monitoring and record-keeping requirements intended to ensure
that the emission controls are operated and maintained properly.

For example,

cleaners must check for PCE emissions from the cleaning equipment weekly using
handheld monitoring equipment, and repair most leaks within twenty-four hours of
detection. Excluding the cost of the pollution control equipment (which is part of the
capital cost of the dry cleaning machine), annual compliance costs (including
training, record-keeping, permit and emission fees, and hazardous waste disposal)
range between $5,483 and $8,274 for an average dry cleaner. 130
Conceptually, enforcement of Rule 1421 should encourage diffusion of
alternative technologies by increasing the cost of using existing technology, either by
imposing penalties directly for noncompliance or by increasing compliance
expenditures by firms in response to the increased risk of detection.131 In theory, the
drive to maximize profits should trigger a cost-effective search for innovative
technologies that minimize compliance costs. In reality, the costs of compliance do
not appear to be a significant driver of innovation among dry cleaners. This is due
in some measure to the fact that most cleaners do not actually incur the full amount

The California rule, “Air Toxic Control Measure (ATCM)—Emissions of Perchloroethylene from Dry Cleaning
Operations,” was issued by the California Air Resources Board and became effective in 1994. The Federal rule,
promulgated by EPA under the Clean Air Act’s National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants
(NESHAP) program, became effective in 1993. 55 Fed. Reg. 49354 (September 22, 1993), codified at 40 C.F.R. Part
63, Subpart M.
129 SQAQMD Rule 1421.
130
See PPERC, supra, n. __, at 4-13 to 4-27; USEPA, Substitutes Assessment, supra, n. __, at 10-7. Among process dependent
expenses, only energy costs and pressing labor costs are higher . Sinsheimer & Gottlieb, supra, n. __, at App. 2-A, 7-11.
131 See, e.g., Jaffe, et al.., supra, n. __, at __-__.
128
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of those costs.

Compliance audits of drycleaners conducted in five urban areas

between 1996 and 1999 revealed astonishing levels of noncompliance with Rule 1421
and similar rules in other jurisdictions. As Table 1 shows, non-compliance rates
ranged between 79 and 98% percent, and the percentage of facilities that had PCE
emissions or discharges was between 22% and 67%.
Table 1
Compliance Audit Results
Location and Year

Number of
Facilities in
Compliance

Rate of
Noncompliance

Percentage of
Facilities with
PCE Leaks

Sacramento 1996132

Number
of
Facilities
Inspected
30

4

87%

60%

South Coast

208

21

90%

22%

340

17

95%

35%

Bay Area 1998135

41

9

79%

67%

New York 1998136

200

3

98%

No data

Massachusetts

100

6

94%

No data

1997133
South Coast
1999134

1998137

Historically, the low compliance rates in the South Coast can be traced to at
least two factors. First, as a result of reductions in AQMD’s enforcement budget,

132 California Air Resources Board, An Evaluation of the Sacramento Metropolitan Air Quality Management
District’s Air Pollution Control Program (1997).
133 South Coast Air Quality Management Board, Fact Sheet: Findings from Dry Cleaner Inspections in South Coast
AQMD (1997).
134 Malloy & Sinsheimer, supra, n. __, at 88.
135 California Air Resources Board, An Evaluation of the Bay Area Air Quality Management District’s Air Pollution
Control Program (1998).
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between 1994 and 2000 most of the South Coast’s dry cleaners went for five years or
more without an inspection.138 Second, the consequences of noncompliance with Rule
1421 are often minimal.139 For example, between October 2000 and March 2001, the
penalties paid by individual dry cleaning facilities ranged between just $50.00 and
$400.00.
2.

Implementation of Permitting Rules

Rule 1401 is intended to reduce health risks associated with toxic air
emissions from new sources.140 As part of the permitting process for new sources,
Rule 1401 essentially requires the new facility to use the “Best Available Control
Technology for Toxics” (“T-BACT”).141 For the dry cleaning sector, AQMD (like many
air pollution control districts in California) views PCE equipment having primary
and secondary emissions controls as meeting the BACT standard.142
AQMD permitting staff has the authority to classify wet cleaning technology
as T-BACT. Rule 1401 defines T-BACT as the most stringent emissions limitation
or control technique that has been “achieved in practice” for the relevant class of

Drycleaners News, January 1999. Volume 48, No.1 at __-__.
Drycleaners News, November 1998. Volume 47, No. 11 at __.
138 Interview of Edwin Pupka of SCAQMD by author and Peter Sinsheimer (December 2000).
139 The District’s enforcement policy provides that an inspector can respond to an observed violation in one of two
ways. First, for minor violations (i.e., administrative or procedural violations or violations that involve a de minimis
amount of emissions) that are not immediately corrected, the inspector issues a notice to comply (NOC). If the
facility responds by coming into compliance, no further action will be taken (SCAQMD Rule 112). For non-minor
violations or for repeat violations, the inspector issues a Notice of Violation (NOV), which is forwarded to the
SCAQMD District Prosecutor’s Office. Depending upon the circumstances, the NOV may lead to administrative,
civil or criminal proceedings seeking penalties and other relief.
140 Rule 1401 also applies to existing sources that are modified so as to cause an increase in toxic air contaminant
emissions, and to existing sources that are relocated. Toxic emissions from existing sources that are neither
modified nor relocated are regulated under SCAQMD Rule 1402: Control of Toxic Air Contaminants from Existing
Sources.
141 AQMD Rule 1401.
142 See SCAQMD Regulation XIII.
136
137
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sources.143 Wet cleaning meets the elements of this definition. First, it is clear that
wet cleaning provides for the most stringent emission control—there are no
emissions of PCE from wet cleaning. The fact that wet cleaning involves a process
change rather than the application of a control technology does not prevent it from
being T-BACT. The AQMD and other agencies all acknowledge, at least in principle,
that changes in production processes can qualify as T-BACT.144 Second, wet cleaning
has been “achieved in practice,” a term of art that looks to the commercial
availability and viability of technology in question.145 As discussed in Section __,
above, wet cleaning is used as an effective, commercially viable substitute for PCE
dry cleaning both in the United States and abroad.146

Third, the commercial use of

wet cleaning has occurred in the same industry sector as PCE dry cleaning:
professional garment care. It has been used successfully to clean the same types
and range of clothing for the same types of customers as PCE dry cleaning.147
Notwithstanding the technical and financial viability of wet cleaning
technology, conventional pollution control devices remain T-BACT in the South

SCAQMD Rule 1401(c)(2).
See, e.g., AQMD Rule 1401(c)(2)(B) (recognizing a process or basic equipment change as an “emissions limitation
or control technique.” )
145 Although the term “achieved in practice” is not defined in the rule, elsewhere AQMD has stated that a technology
is achieved in practice if it meets four criteria: (a) commercial availability (i.e., it is offered by at least one vendor in
the United States for full scale operation), (b) reliability (i.e., it has been installed and operated reliably for at least
one year at a comparable commercial operation, (c) effectiveness (i.e., it performs effectively over the range of
operation expected for that type of equipment, and (d) cost effectiveness. AQMD, BEST AVAILABLE CONTROL
TECHNOLOGY GUIDELINES, PART D (BACT GUIDELINES FOR NON-MAJOR POLLUTING FACILITIES) 27
(2000)(hereinafter “BACT GUIDELINES”).
143
144

AQMD’s definition of achieved in practice is generally consistent with the definition used by EPA, with the exception
that AQMD has added a cost-effectiveness criteria. This additional criteria is only applied to determinations
affecting “non-major” sources, which would include most dry cleaning facilities. See AQMD, BACT GUIDELINES,
supra, n. __, at Part A, 16 (describing criteria for major sources) and Part D, 27 (establishing criteria for non-major
sources). AQMD’s BACT Guidelines set forth procedures for determining cost-effectiveness in the standard scenario
involving add-on control technology, and are of limited use in the cases of process change. See AQMD, BACT
GUIDELINES, supra, n. __, at Part D, 28-31. Given the fact that wet cleaning is less expensive than PCE dry cleaning,
and obviously more effective at reducing PCE emissions, wet cleaning systems appear to meet the cost-effectiveness
standard. In its STAFF REPORT regarding amendments to Rule 1421, AQMD performed an economic analysis of wet
cleaning and found it to be cost effective using a methodology developed specifically for the case of process changes.
AQMD, STAFF REPORT, supra, n. __, at 3-2.
146 The studies of dedicated wet cleaning shops demonstrate that wet cleaning technology is commercially available,
reliable, technically effective, and cost effective. See notes __-__.
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Coast and beyond for PCE dry cleaning.

Several interrelated factors appear to

contribute to wet cleaning’s failure to achieve standing as T-BACT: an agency
culture of noninterference, impaired information flow within the agency, and the
nature of the permitting managers’ task definition.
Agency culture refers to the pervasive and powerful reluctance at the AQMD
and other environmental regulatory agencies to “interfere” directly with a facility’s
production process or other business operations.

Historically, environmental

regulators consistently relied upon end-of-pipe control and treatment to manage
pollution, largely viewing the process that created the pollution as a “black box.”
Despite hortatory language in statutes, regulations and strategic plans about the
value of pollution prevention, many regulators continue to view changes to the
production process as beyond their ken. Indeed, at the federal level, environmental
groups have turned to the courts to force EPA to implement statutory provisions
that called for direct regulation of primary and secondary production processes.148
For example, a court order was needed before EPA would implement a provision in
the Clean Air Act that required the agency to consider potential process changes in
establishing “maximum achievable control technology” for purposes of the federal air
toxics program.149

See, e.g., SINSHEIMER, ET AL., supra, n. __, at 4-6 to 4-8; STAR & EWING, supra, n. __, at 18-19.
A primary production process uses raw materials as feedstock, while a secondary process reuses or recycles
previously used materials or residuals from a primary process.
149 National Lime ASS’N V. Environmental Protection Agency, 233 F. 3d 625, 633-34 (D.C. Cir. 2000). In that case,
th
e Sierra Club challenged EPA’s failure to set emission standards for several hazardous air pollutants emitted from
cement manufacturing plants. EPA argued that under the Clean Air Act, emission standards were to be based on
the “maximum achievable control technology” (“MACT”) currently in use in the industry. Thus, contended EPA, if
no existing sources currently control emissions of a given pollutant, then EPA need not set a “MACT” standard for
that pollutant. Id. at 630. The court rejected EPA’s argument, holding that the absence of an existing control
147
148
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This reticence to intrude in the business operations of regulated firms was

evident in our interviews with AQMD managers, who emphasized that the staff’s
expertise lay in managing risks created by industrial operations rather than in
understanding the underlying production processes and industry settings.150
Moreover, agency managers view mandatory process changes as riskier for the
affected business than add-on control requirements.

While a mistake about the

feasibility of a new add-on control technology can impose costs on the business, a
mistake about the feasibility of a process change could undermine the business’
basic viability.151
The second factor that contributed to wet cleaning’s failure to achieve the
status of T-BACT is the uneven distribution of information within AQMD
concerning the feasibility of wet cleaning as a substitute technology. As we noted
previously, wet cleaners using specialized pressing equipment can clean the full
range of garments cleaned by dry cleaners with the same quality. At the time of the
interviews in late 2000 and early 2001, staff members in the Planning, Rule
Development and Area Sources Division and in Technology Advancement Office

technology did not relieve the agency of its clear statutory obligation to set emission standards for each hazardous
air pollutant emitted from the source. In reaching that conclusion, the court relied in part on a Senate Report that
stated:
The technologies, practices or strategies which are to be considered in setting
emission standards under this subsection go beyond the traditional end-ofstack treatment or abatement system. The Administrator [of EPA] is to give
priority to technologies or strategies which reduce the amount of pollution
generated through process changes or the substitution of materials less
hazardous. Pollution prevention is to be the preferred strategy wherever
possible.
Id. at 634 (citing S. REP. NO. 101-128, at 168 (1989).
Likewise, the agency began to regulate certain forms of hazardous waste recycling only after losing a judicial
challenge to its policies. See American Petroleum Institute v. Environmental Protection Agency, 906 F. 2d 729, 74041 (1990)(“API”). The issue in API was whether EPA should have used its authority to regulate hazardous waste to
control slag produced from industrial furnaces burning emission control dust from steel manufacturing plants. EPA
was reluctant to treat the slag as a hazardous waste because it viewed the recycling process to be “like” a primary
production process, and thus beyond the reach of the hazardous waste regulatory program.. For discussion of the
API case and its impact on recycling regulation, see Timothy F. Malloy, Once More Unto the Breach, 7 VILLANOVA
ENVT’L L. J. 1, 23-25 (1996).
150 Interview of Jack P. Broadbent of AQMD by authors (November, 2000); Interview of Chung Lui, Director of TAO
(November, 2001).
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(TAO) were familiar with the studies that demonstrated this fact. Indeed, TAO has
provided financial support for several seminal studies in this area. Yet, managers in
the AQMD offices responsible for permitting, engineering and enforcement
continued to question the viability of wet cleaning as a substitute technology. In
particular, during interviews at that time, AQMD permitting and enforcement
managers stated that wet cleaning cannot successfully clean the full range of
garments, is more costly, or is otherwise not adequate.152

Moreover, they were

unaware of the AQMD-funded studies that contradicted their conclusions.
There appears to be no mechanism for systematically disseminating
information concerning innovative technologies from the TAO to the permitting or
enforcement staff. As one official described it, such information moves from TAO to
other staff through “ad hoc osmosis.”153

Without access to current information

concerning wet cleaning, AQMD staff responsible for making or participating in TBACT determinations apparently lacked the technical information needed to trigger
and conduct an appropriate T-BACT analysis of this technology.
The organizational structure of AQMD also contributed to the continued
reliance on conventional control technology as T-BACT.

As with virtually every

large organization, the work of the District is distributed among a number of
specialized sub-units, such as permitting, rule development, enforcement, and

Interview of Chung Lui, Director of TAO (November, 2001).
Interview of Michael Mills of SCAQMD by author and Peter Sinsheimer (December 2000); Interview of Edwin
Pupka of SCAQMD by author and Peter Sinsheimer (December 2000). The lack of information was not limited to
staff at AQMD. Personnel at the California Air Resources Board responsible for rule development for the dry
cleaning sector also held similar views of wet cleaning in late 2000. Interview of Victor Douglas of CARB by author
and Peter Sinsheimer ( 2001).

151
152
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others.154

Sub-unit managers tend to focus on priorities identified by upper

management as manifested in the budget, the strategic plan, and other formal and
informal communications. Consequently, members of organizations typically avoid
activities that do not fit their perception of the organization expects from them, and
that divert resources from the sub-unit’s priorities.155 Their task definition—what
the organization expects from them—is defined to some extent by formal
pronouncements such as job descriptions or standard operating procedures.
However, informal signals such as the type of information received by a sub-unit can
also influence task definition; if little effort is made to provide a sub-unit with
information about a particular issue, the sub-unit is unlikely to view that issue as a
priority.156
It appears that the permitting staff considers encouraging the diffusion of
new process technologies such as wet cleaning to be beyond its mandate, viewing
such activity as a role better played by the rule development staff.157

As discussed

above, permitting managers view the choice of process technology to be a business
decision, and define the permitting role as limited to identifying appropriate
pollution control technologies.158

Because permitting managers consider choices

about process changes (as opposed to choices about pollution control technology) to
be business decisions, they direct their staff to avoid involvement in a permittee’s

Interview of Peter Mieras of SCAQMD by author and Peter Sinsheimer (December 2000).
See, e.g. JOSEPH DIMENTO, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND AMERICAN BUSINESS 135-47 (1986)(identifying
organizational characteristics of agencies that affect performance, including coordination between sub-units and
allocation of resources); JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT
101-104 (1989)(discussing competition for resources within agencies).
155 JOSEPH L. BOWER, MANAGING THE RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROCESS: A STUDY OF CORPORATE PLANNING AND
INVESTMENT 50 (2d ed. 1986); HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 112 (4TH ED. 1997).
156 See William Ocasio, Towards an Attention-Based View of the Firm, 18 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 187, 194-95 (1997)
(discussing influence of communication channels on an individual’s perceived task definition); RICHARD M. CYERT &
JAMES G. MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM 108-10 (1963) (discussing the impact of information routing
rules on the definition of member’s roles within the organization).
157 Interview of Michael Mills of SCAQMD by author and Peter Sinsheimer (December 2000).
158 See text accompanying note __.
153
154
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decisions regarding process changes. As one manager put it: “It’s not really our
place. We just make sure they comply with the rules.”159
This task definition is supported by the lack of systematic communication
between TAO and the permitting division regarding innovative clean technologies.160
In addition, the permitting division recognizes the organizational costs it would face
should it use the T-BACT process to encourage diffusion of wet cleaning.

One

permitting official acknowledged that wet cleaning probably fits the criteria for TBACT, but believed identifying it as such would have an unacceptably disruptive
effect on the permitting function given the likely vehement reaction form industry
and inevitable permit appeals that would follow.161

V.

Altering the Selection Environment

Having identified systemic barriers to innovation within the selection
environment, we now consider potential policy responses. This section examines a
series of regulatory approaches aimed at altering the three aspects of the selection
environment discussed above; namely, information flow, costs and benefits of the
innovation, and regulations. In each case, we anticipate the likely response of the

Id.
It is likely that the relationship between information flow and task definition incorporates multiple feedback
loops. In other words, the failure to receive information concerning innovative process technologies may buttresses
the permitting managers’ view that production process issues are beyond the permitting division, while that task
definition also inhibits efforts by permitting personnel to seek and obtain such information.
161 Interview of Michael Mills of SCAQMD by author and Peter Sinsheimer (December 2000).
159
160
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system to regulatory alternative and consider the potential social costs associated
with it.

A.

Information Flow to Potential Adopters
Section IV concluded that a substantial majority of dry cleaners lacked

accurate information about wet cleaning technology.162

Research in innovation

suggests that demonstration projects and educational outreach campaigns can be
effective tools in overcoming such barriers.

163

In a demonstration project, the

government sponsors one or more sites at which the new technology is used,
providing firms with the opportunity to observe the innovation under actual
operating conditions.164

Outreach activities, including such things as workshops,

education campaigns, or information clearinghouses, attempt to teach potential
adopters about the technology and perhaps provide technical support to new
adopters.

Such

projects can help create the “social infrastructure” needed to

support the diffusion of new technology: skilled personnel to provide technical
training; experienced installers, operators and repair technicians; knowledgeable
vendors such as distributors; and cooperative relationships among all of those

See notes __ and accompanying text.
Jaffe, et al., supra, n. __, at ___; Allen Blackman, The Economics of Technology Diffusion: Implications for
Climate Policy in Developing Countries, Resources for the Future Discussion Paper 99-42 at ___ (1999). In the
agricultural industry and other sectors, the government used such techniques effectively. Shelley H. Metzenbaum,
Information, Environmental Performance, and Environmental Management Systems, in REGULATING FROM THE
INSIDE: CAN ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS ACHIEVE POLICY GOALS? 146, 160 (Cary Coglianese and
Jennifer Nash eds. 2001) (discussing federal agricultural experiment stations and extensions used to create an
information infrastructure to promote innovations in farming techniques); Stephen J. DeCanio, Barriers Within
Firms to Energy-Efficient Investment, 21 ENERGY POLICY 906, 911-912 (1993) (observing that agricultural
experiment stations served as an information clearinghouse for farmers).
California recently enacted SB 998, which establishes the Nontoxic Dry Cleaning Incentive Trust Fund to be used by
the Air Resources Board to fund wet cleaning facilities as demonstration projects.
162
163
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parties.

Moreover, demonstration projects can assist policymakers and industry

alike in resolving uncertainties about the commercial viability of new technologies.165
Yet given the structure of the sector and the relationship between regulators
and sector members, demonstration projects and outreach efforts standing alone are
unlikely to achieve widespread diffusion of wet cleaning in the near term.

The

professional cleaning industry is highly decentralized and dominated by small,
thinly staffed plants.

This creates practical problems for the government in

disseminating the necessary information, both in reaching all the cleaners and
assuring that they allocate some of their limited attention to the information. For
example, it has been reported that in many cases, cleaners will simply throw out
correspondence from regulators without opening it.166 Moreover, cleaners may be
highly skeptical of information disseminated by regulators or contractors hired by
the regulators.167 In our survey, only 23% of the cleaners considered information
from government regulators concerning cleaning technologies to be very important.
Almost 40% of the cleaners found such government information to be not important
at all. Not surprisingly, government sources fared worse on this point than three
other likely information sources we asked about: vendors, trade publications and

165For

example, the AQMD’s Technology Advancement Office’s wet cleaning demonstration project, which
contributed to the start-up of ten wet cleaning shops, led AQMD's own rule development staff to conclude that wet
cleaning is a viable alternative to dry cleaning. SCAQMD, Staff Report, 1-18 to 1-19. The project, which provided
outreach, financial support, and technical assistance to participating cleaners, played a significant role in
encouraging several dry cleaners to switch. SINSHEIMER, ET AL.., supra, n. __.
166 Interview of Nancy Feldman of SCAQMD by author (October 2001).
167 U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, Industry, Technology, and the Environment: Competitive
Challenges and Business Opportunities ___ (OTA-ITE-586 1994); Interview of Nancy Feldman of SCAQMD by
author (October 2001).
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shows, and other cleaners, each of which was found to be very important by almost
half of the cleaners.

B.

Modifying the Costs/Benefits of Adoption
Section IV also concluded that the perceived risk of failure and costs of

learning the new technology appear to outweigh whatever value the cleaners may
place on the putative benefits of switching. Below we examine the value in this
selection environment of three policy tools intended to directly alter the costs and
benefits of the new technology: increased enforcement, excise taxes on PCE and
subsidies for adoption of wet cleaning.

1.

Enhanced Enforcement of Rule 1421

We stated above that compliance costs with Rule 1421 were too small to
encourage a technology switch. While penalty levels certainly could be increased so
as to trigger greater diffusion, this would require a substantial change in AQMD
policy and regulations, and in California state law governing enforcement.168 The
low penalty numbers reflect the broader compliance assistance approach taken in
California towards all small businesses under which regulators attempt to educate
operators about the existing rules, and gently "nudge" them into compliance.169
Even if the enforcement and penalty levels were increased, the “paperworkbased,” self-reporting nature of Rule 1421 itself is a barrier to the effective use of
enforcement as a diffusion catalyst. Because comprehensive inspection of cleaners’
compliance with substantive emission limitations and operation and maintenance
168
Section 42403 of the Health and Safety Code establishes factors to be considered in setting penalty amounts for civil action.
Encouraging diffusion of alternative technologies does not easily fit within any of the factors.
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obligations is costly and resource intensive, it is rarely done.

When the self-

reporting form of regulation is coupled with limited enforcement resources in this
industry sector, it raises the specter of widespread noncompliance and underreporting, and ultimately excess emissions.170
2.

Environmental Excise Taxes

Regulators could attempt to raise the costs of dry cleaning through an excise
tax or fee on the purchase of PCE, thus discouraging PCE usage and inducing a
technology switch. Economists have identified two general types of “environmental
taxes.” The first is the Pigouvian tax, which is designed to discourage the taxed
activity by imposing the full social cost of the activity on the taxpayer, thus raising
the price of engaging in the activity.171 A Pigouvian tax should in theory prevent
future environmental harm by encouraging the adoption of alternative materials or
processes.172 The federal ozone-depleting chemicals tax, which imposed an excise tax
on the sale or use of listed ozone depleting chemicals by manufacturers and
importers, is an example of such a tax.173 The second is the “polluter pays”-type tax,
which captures the cost of regulation or cleanup from the firm or sector, giving rise

Interview of Edwin Pupka of SCAQMD by author and Peter Sinsheimer (December 2000).
For example, one experienced inspector noted that in nine years of inspecting dry cleaners, he had yet to see one
facility that recorded a PCE leak from their equipment (Rascke, 2001).
171 Hoerner, supra, n. __, at 186; Barthold, supra, n. __, at 135.
172 Hoerner, supra, n. __, at 186.
173 The tax was enacted as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, CITE. For an overview of the
structure and operation of the tax, see Hoerner, supra, n. __, at 186-188-95. For a fascinating “behind the scenes”
view of the legislative history of the tax, see Brathold, supra, n. __, at 136-144. There has been some debate over
whether the ozone-depleting chemicals tax is actually a Pigouvian tax given the fact that pre-existing federal
regulations also provided for gradually increasing caps on the production and consumption of such chemicals. Some
commentators have argued that the tax was a windfall profits tax intended to capture monopoly profits enjoyed by
producers as a result of the federal caps. See Barthold, supra, n. __, at 135, n. 4; J. Andrew Hoerner, Tax Tools for
Protecting the Atmosphere: The US Ozone-Depleting Chemicals Tax, in GREEN BUDGET REFORM 185, 187 (Robert
Gale, et al. eds. 1995).
169
170

52

INNOVATION, REGULATION AND THE SELECTION ENVIRONMENT

to the cost.174 The Superfund tax, used to fund Hazardous Substance Superfund, is
an example of the polluter pays approach.175 The two categories of taxes are not
mutually exclusive, and many taxes have elements of both types.176
At least ten states have imposed excise taxes on the purchase or use of PCE
(ranging from $3.50/gallon in Illinois to $10.00/gallon in Oregon). However, none of
these taxes constitute a pure Pigouvian tax.177 Generally speaking, the existing PCE
taxes are not designed to cause a radical technology shift, but rather to fund the
cleanup of contaminated dry cleaner sites. In many of the states having such fees,
the participating dry cleaners are released from cleanup liability in exchange for
both paying the tax and using upgraded PCE dry cleaning equipment and
procedures.178 While the taxes increase the cost of PCE solvent, they decrease the
contingent liabilities facing participating PCE dry cleaners and support the diffusion
of state of the art PCE equipment.

Thus, rather than encouraging a shift to

alternative technologies, these programs may actually provide incentives for the
continued use of dry cleaning processes.
Even a pure Pigouvian-type excise tax program may be of very limited use as
a catalyst for diffusion. The annual cost of purchasing PCE is relatively small for
most dry cleaners. For a shop processing 200 garments per day (the median daily
amount for cleaners in our survey), annual solvent costs would be approximately

supra, n. __, at 187.
See the Hazardous Substance Response Revenue Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2796 (Dec. 11, 1980). The
polluter pays tax can take at least two forms. In the first, the tax is imposed on a population of actors to fund
specific activities by the government necessitated by the activity. Thomas A. Barthold, Issues in the Design of
Environmental Excise Taxes, 8 J. ECO. PERSP. 133, 134 (1994). This form would include charges on the discharge of
wastewaters paid to regulators to finance the costs of purification plants and regulatory oversight. Michiel H H
Hötte, et al., Levy on Surface Water in the Netherlands, in GREEN BUDGET REFORM 220, 221-22 (Robert Gale, et al.
eds. 1995). In the second form, the taxes is essentially an insurance premium in a risk pooling program addressing
potential environmental harms that are associated with the taxed activity or material. Barthold, supra, n. __, at
135. The federal Superfund Hazardous Substance tax is the best known example of this form..
176 Barthold, supra, n. __, at 135.
177 State Coalition for Drycleaner Remediation, State Programs to Clean Up Drycleaners, Table 2: Fee Structures,
http://www.drycleancoalition.org (visited September 4, 2001).
174Hoerner,
175
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$850.179 Even applying the largest existing tax of $10/gallon to such a shop would
raise total solvent costs by approximately $1,300.

The present value of such

payments over a ten-year horizon is approximately $9,200. This tax may simply be
too small to cause a technology switch. In our survey, most cleaners found a rebate
of almost $11,000 insufficient enticement to consider wet cleaning.180
Of course, the tax could be raised until the cost of PCE overcomes the
barriers to diffusion, but it appears that the level would have to be quite high.

181

Between 1996 and 2001, the solvent tax in Oregon gradually rose from $10 to almost
$27/gallon. Yet PCE continued to be the overwhelmingly dominant solvent; there is
only one dedicated wet cleaner in Oregon.182 Moreover, as the amount of the tax is
increases, so too do the problems of enforcing it.

Rather than switching to

alternative technologies, many cleaners may avoid the tax by obtaining “black

Id.
This figure assumes that PCE cost is $0.0136/garment. PPERC, supra, n. __, at App. 4-F. EPA estimates annual
solvent costs to be approximately $1,400, based on a facility cleaning 53,333 pounds of clothes annually in a PCE
machine with primary and secondary controls, using 210 gallons of solvent each year at a solvent cost $6.83 dollars
per gallon. USEPA, Substitutes Assessment, supra, n. __, at 10-7. At least in the South Coast region where many
dry cleaners are subject to annual limitations on PCE usage, the usage rate of 210 gallons appears high. In our
survey, when asked how much PCE they need to use to operate their business successfully, only 12% of the cleaners
stated that they used more than 120 gallons per year, and only 8% used more than 150 gallons annually. The
median usage was 65 gallons per year. Of course, solvent costs will vary depending on the type of machine used and
other factors.
180 There is some risk, however, in assuming that cleaners’ views of the value of a purchase price rebate tells us
anything about their likely reaction to a PCE excise tax. Research by cognitive psychologists and behavioral
economists regarding the so-called “endowment effect” suggests that cleaners may be more concerned about a loss
(payment of tax) than about a gain (receipt of rebate). See MAX BAZERMAN, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION
MAKING ___-___ (1998). For a critique of the application of endowment effect research in the business context, see
Jennifer Arlen, et. al, Endowment Effects Within Corporate Agency Relationships, USC CLEO Research Paper No.
C01-1 (August 2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=276110.
181 See Madhu Khanna and David Zilberman, Incentives, Precision Technology and Environmental Protection, 23
ECOLOGICAL ECON. 25, 39 (1997) (observing that where the price elasticity of a particular input-use is low and the
costs of that input are a small portion of the firm’s total production costs, very high taxes would be needed to create
meaningful reductions in use of the input.)
182 Interview with Ellen Glendening of the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality by Timothy Malloy (2001).
178
179
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market” PCE.183 Indeed, professional cleaners and state officials report that in states
with existing PCE taxes for remediation programs, black markets for PCE already
exist.184

It is extremely difficult for government inspectors to accurately determine

the amount of PCE purchased and used by individual cleaners. Also, increasing the
excise tax raises the costs of the program for government: as the tax rate goes up,
noncompliance climbs, and ultimately the costs of enforcing the tax escalate.185
Finally, imposition of substantial excise tax could have spillover effects on workers
and consumers in the form of lower wages or higher cleaning prices, respectively, as
a result of the increased compliance costs or taxes paid by dry cleaners. From a
policy perspective, government regulators may determine that such social costs are
acceptable. However, these costs could be largely avoided by using the alternative
policy tool of a gradual phase-out of PCE dry cleaning, which is examined below.
Undoubtedly, as a theoretical matter, the barriers to an effective excise tax
approach could be overcome.

For example, the black market problem could be

addressed by imposing the tax on the PCE equipment itself rather than upon the
solvent.186 In contrast to the complexity involved in determining the source and
amount of PCE actually purchased and used by a facility, it would be quite simple
for inspectors to ascertain whether or not a facility is using a PCE machine. Also,
the government could reduce the impact of increased tax enforcement costs by
allocating tax receipts and nonpayment penalties to support enforcement efforts.
Similarly, tax revenues could be redistributed to affected workers or even consumers

Id.; John McClaren, Black Markets and Optimal Evadable Taxation, 108 ECONOMIC JOURNAL 665, 605-06 (1998).
Such was the case with taxation of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs); taxation during their phase-out led to the
development of a black market for CFCs. United States Navy, Black Market Activity Reminiscent of the Prohibition
Era, CFC/HALON NEWSLETTER ___ (December 1994).
184 Interview of Victor Douglas of CARB by author and Peter Sinsheimer ( 2001); Oregon Department of
Environmental Quality, Dry Cleaner Advisory Committee, May 16, 2000 Meeting Minutes,
http://www.deq.state.or.us/wmc/cleanup/dcmin051600.htm (visited September 6, 2001).
185 Oregon Department of Environmental Quality, supra, n. __.
183
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to offset spillover effects of the excise tax, although accomplishing such
redistribution could present significant administrative challenges.187
Nonetheless, the taxation alternative still faces two very practical problems
that severely undercut its potential viability in this context. First, it would be quite
difficult to identify the level of taxation needed to spur the appropriate number of
cleaners to switch from PCE use.188

This could lead to the need for several

adjustments to the tax rate over time, creating administrative costs for the
government and exposing the tax repeatedly to the second practical problem:
political opposition to taxation generally.189

Under current law, enactment and

perhaps even revision of such a tax would require legislative action in California and
likely in most other states as well. Like many other forms of taxation, a tax on PCE
or PCE equipment significant enough in size to alter technology choice in the sector
will likely face substantial political challenges.190 While economists and others have

The authors thank Werner Hirsch for suggesting the use of a machine tax to address the black market problem.
Turner, et al., Green Taxes, Waste Management and Political Economy, 53 J. ENVTL. MANAGEMENT 121, 124
(1998).
188 See, e,g., Turner, et al., supra, n. __, at 124 (observing that it is “difficult to establish in advance the tax level that
is necessary to achieve a particular environmental objective”); Barthold, supra, n. __, at 140 (discussing difficulties
involved in determining the rate of tax to impose); STEVEN P. KELMAN, WHAT PRICE INCENTIVES 100-23 (1981)
(identifying concern over the ability to calculate the appropriate tax rate as one significant concern about emission
taxes among legislators).
189 Turner, et al., supra, n. __, at 124 (noting that efforts to make subsequent corrective changes to the tax rate can
take considerable time and face significant political opposition); David Pearce, The Role of Carbon Taxes in
Adjusting to Global Warming, 101 THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL 938, 942 (observing that some commentators fear that
“a carbon tax will be a “hit-and-miss” affair, inducing hostile reaction from industry and consumers as it has to be
adjusted in an iterative fashion” but concluding that it is not clear how serious a concern this is.)
190 In Oregon, a proposal to increase the PCE tax from approximately $27 to $30 caused a profound legislative
reaction; the statute was changed to instead cap the tax at $10/gallon. Interview with Ellen Glendening of the
Oregon Department of Environmental Quality by Timothy Malloy (2001). There is reason to believe that there
would be strong opposition in California as well. In 1995, a state dry cleaner trade group sponsored legislation
creating a $20 gallon PCE tax with an associated liability waiver for cleaners. The group withdrew the legislation in
the face of withering opposition from PCE manufacturers, environmentalists, and dry cleaners themselves. WALL
STREET JOURNAL., State EPA Finds PCE in Many Wells (October 2, 1996). Of course, in the California case, parties
such as environmentalists may have opposed the tax because of the liability waiver rather than because of any
disagreement with the concept of taxing PCE consumption. The point is that tax proposals are likely to result in
substantial, vigorous lobbying efforts directed at a broad range of legislators.
186

187R.K.
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long touted environmental taxes as efficient, effective policy tools191, politicians and
regulators in the United States in particular have been remarkably steadfast in
their lack of enthusiasm for the use of environmental taxes.192 There are numerous
potential reasons for this reluctance.193 Many legislators fear that voting for a tax
will undermine their political future, and thus prefer to support regulation that
ostensibly produces benefits rather than costs.194

Others may have ideological

concerns with the notion of firms “paying to pollute,” or may harbor misgivings
about the technical challenges of designing and implementing a workable, effective
tax program.195

Pigou was apparently the first to identify the efficiency gains that could be obtained through the use of a tax in
this way. See Robert W. Hahn and Robert N. Stavins, Economic Incentives for Environmental Protection:
Integrating Theory and Practice, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 464, 464 (1992), citing ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF
WELFARE (1920). Emission charges and other taxes have been championed by economists for decades thereafter.
See, e.g., Edwin Mills, Economic Incentives in Air Pollution Control, in THE ECONOMICS OF AIR POLLUTION 40, 46-50
(Harold Wolozin ed. 1966); JAMES E. KRIER AND EDMUND URSIN, POLLUTION AND POLICY 303-304 (1977); but see
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Effluent Charges: A Critique, 6 CANADIAN J. ECON. 512, 527 (identifying a series of real
world problems that an effluent charge program would face.)
192 To date, only two federal taxes reflect a Pigouvian approach: the ozone-depleting chemical excise tax and the “gas
guzzler” excise tax which varies with the automobiles’ fuel economy rating. CITE to taxes; Barthold, supra, n. __, at
136. Numerous commentators have observed the reluctance of many legislators, particularly in the United States,
to rely upon Pigouvian-like environmental taxes. See, e.g., Barthold, supra, n. __, at 136; Robert N. Stavins, What
Can We Learn from the Grand Policy Experiment? Lessons from SO2 Allowance Trading, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 69, 74
(1998); Dieter Cansier and Raimund Krumm, Air Pollution Taxation: An Empirical Survey, 23 ECOLOGICAL ECON.
59, 59 (1997); Maureen L. Cropper and Wallace E. Oates, Environmental Economics: A Survey, 30 J. ECON. LIT. 675,
689-92 (1992).
193 See Cropper and Oates, supra, n. __, at 685-692; Barthold, supra, n. __, at 142-145; Stavins, supra, n. __, at 71-76
(using a political economy approach to evaluate under-use of environmental taxes).
194 Barthold, supra, n. __, at 143. So-called “green taxes”(also known as “environmental tax reform”) may offer an
alternative that allows a legislator to support environmental excise taxes while helping the general economy.
Environmental tax reform would replace distortionary taxes on labor, income and investment with environmental
taxes on socially undesirable activities or materials that cause pollution, waste or resource depletion. Benoît
Bosquet, Environmental Tax Reform: Does It Work? A Survey of Empirical Evidence, 34 EVNTL. ECON. 1919 (2000)
(providing a survey and evaluation of green taxes in Europe); Turner, et al., supra, n. __, at 123. Such taxes
ostensibly create a “double dividend”—it would produce an environmental benefit by discouraging the polluting
activity, but would also provide economic benefits by freeing factors of production from taxation without reducing
government revenues. Bosquet, supra, n. __, at 19; Lawrence H. Goulder, Environmental Taxation and the Double
Dividend: A Reader’s Guide, 2 INTL. TAX AND PUBLIC FINANCE 157, __ (1995).
195 Barthold, supra, n. __, at ___; KELMAN, supra, n. __, at 101,108; Stavins, supra, n. __, at __. Shifting to a taxbased regulatory strategy can create strategic issues within the legislature as well, as the relevant legislative
committee in charge of environmental regulation may have to cede control over an environmental issue to the
legislature’s tax-writing committee. Stavins, supra, n. __, at 72. Environmental groups may wish to keep such
issues within the environment committees, which frequently tend to be more pro-environment, and away from the
tax committees, which are often more conservative. Id.; Kelman, supra, n. __, at ___. Barthold relates a story
regarding Congressional infighting concerning the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments that illustrates the relevance of
committee jurisdiction. When proposals for the imposition of emissions fees were being considered, the House Ways
and Means Committee (which has jurisdiction over taxation) and the Energy and Commerce Committee (which has
authority over environmental regulation and enforcement) battled over which committee had jurisdiction over such
fees. The parliamentarian ultimately granted jurisdiction to Energy and Commerce. Barthold, supra, n. __, at 144.
191
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On balance, an excise tax capable of having a meaningful impact on PCE
usage would be administratively complex and (in terms of social costs) potentially
very expensive.

It would combine two controversial actions (i.e., taxation and

regulation of the production process) in one a single policy initiative. Here, where
the goal is to supplant the existing technology rather than manage its emissions, it
is difficult to articulate any significant advantage to suing an excise tax rather than
a direct phase out. However, a PCE tax at lower levels may be a useful tool when
used in combination with other policy tools. For example, the tax could be used to
make other programs, such as tax credits, demonstration projects or enhanced
enforcement, revenue-neutral for the government.

3.

Positive Financial Incentives

This section examines the potential value of government subsidies in
promoting diffusion of wet cleaning technology, focusing on two points.196

First, it

examines the likely impact of a government subsidy in the selection environment of
the garment care industry.

While a subsidy program could be a potentially

meaningful catalyst for diffusion of wet cleaning, it would also be extremely
expensive for the government.

Second, it compares the two types of subsidy

programs, observing that as between the two, a purchase price rebate is more likely
to increase diffusion than an income tax credit of the same magnitude.

Obviously, economic incentive can take many forms, including direct grants or rebates, tax credits, sale tax
exemptions, or accelerated depreciation), low interest loans, loan guarantees, and procurement mandates for

196
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Subsidy programs generally attempt to encourage diffusion by affecting the

costs of the alternative technology.

197

In the early stages of diffusion, new

technologies are often more expensive to purchase or operate than conventional
technologies.198

A subsidy may therefore be used to temporarily offset a price

advantage held by the existing technology until the alternative technology becomes
more competitive.199

For example, in 2001, a federal tax credit for the purchase of

alternatives to PCE dry cleaning systems was proposed in Congress as a temporary
measure designed to reduce costs of new technologies until economies of scale acted
to permanently reduce those costs.200 This justification is misapplied to wet cleaning
because wet cleaning systems are already comparable to the dominant technology in

government agencies. See USEPA, EXPERIENCE, supra, n. __, at 112. We focus on direct rebates and tax credits
because of the prevalence of these two instruments in the literature and in practice.
197STONEMAN, TECHNOLOGICAL DIFFUSION, supra, n. __, at 184; UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, THE UNITED STATES EXPERIENCE WITH ECONOMIC INCENTIVES FOR PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT 20-21
(2001) (hereinafter “EXPERIENCE”); Cropper & Oates, supra, n. __, at 681; Robert W. Lake, Tax Incentives for
Pollution Prevention in New Jersey 9 (1997).
198 KEMP, supra, n. __, at 99; Lake, supra, n. __, at 9.
199
See Hoerner, supra, n. __, at __-___. Tax credits and other financial incentives are also used to reduce the burden
of government mandated pollution control on individual businesses, spreading the costs among taxpayers generally. For
example, tax benefits have historically been available at the federal and state level for businesses that are required
to install pollution control equipment. See Barthold, supra, n. __, at ___ (listing subsidies of this type); Loren
A.Nikolai and Rick Elam, The Pollution Control Tax Incentive: A Non-Incentive, 54 THE ACCOUNTING REV. 119
(1979)(demonstrating how tax subsidies for installation of add-controls controls may miss the mark).
Given the fact that capital and operating costs of wet cleaning systems are comparable to or less than PCE dry
cleaning systems of similar capacity, it may appear that there are no financial burdens to spread. However,
significant burdens may exist depending upon the design of the regulation that leads to the technology switch. For
example, suppose that a prohibition on PCE equipment is put in place which is effective immediately. Cleaners with
fairly new PCE machines may suffer a significant financial burden if they are unable to recover some or all of their
investment in the PCE machine. Thus, for these purposes, the usefulness a tax credit depends upon the type and
extent of financial burdens imposed by the regulation upon the affected cleaners.
200 United States Congress, Committee on Small Business, Subcommittee on Tax, Finance and Exports, Helping
Small Dry Cleaners Adopt Safer Technology: Without Losing Your Shirt. 106th Cong., 2nd sess. (July 20, 2000)
(statement of Rep. Camp). That bill was introduced with strong support from Micell, a major manufacturer of CO2
cleaning systems. The bill ultimately failed to gain passage. In March of 2001, Representative Manzullo introduced
the Small Business Pollution Prevention Opportunity Act (H. R. 978), which would provide a 20% tax credit to dry
cleaners purchasing qualified dry or wet cleaning equipment. Hazardous solvents such as PCE and petroleum are
specifically excluded from coverage. It is unclear whether silicone solvents such as Green Earth™ would be eligible
for the credit. The bill did not move beyond committee. Similar efforts have also occurred in California. In 2001,
California Assemblyman George Nakano introduced AB 845, which would provide a credit of 50% for the cost of
using alternative dry or wet cleaning technology. The purpose of the bill, which was never acted upon by the
Assembly, was to make alternative technologies economically feasible.
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There is simply no need to use a tax credit to make wet cleaning more

affordable for cleaners.201
A subsidy could also be used to give wet cleaning a clear cost advantage, so as
to overcome obstacles other than the capital or operating costs of the technology.
Although the lack of information, the risk of failure, and the burden of learning a
new technology are not easily quantified, it is likely that some level of economic
incentive could encourage at least some cleaners to pay attention to and ultimately
choose wet cleaning. Our survey lends some support to that conclusion.
Respondents in our survey expressed relative indifference to modest tax
credits and rebates, but exhibited stronger interest in such programs as the size of
the subsidy rose. We asked cleaners whether rebates of various sizes would make
them more likely to purchase wet cleaning equipment. As Table 2 indicates, the
percentage of cleaners who would be “much more likely” to switch ranged from 2
percent to 15 percent, depending upon the size of the rebate. When we include those
respondents for whom a rebate made a switch “somewhat more likely”, the
percentages roughly double. Thus, 28% of the respondents would be more likely to
purchase wet cleaning equipment if a 50% purchase price rebate were available.202
Table 2

Clearly, a tax credit would be more useful to promote the use of CO2 technology, which costs as least three times
as much as dry cleaning equipment. Analysis of the value and effectiveness of a tax credit for that purpose is
beyond the scope of this report. However, it is worth noting two facts. First, even some supporters of CO2
technology question whether CO2 equipment will ever be competitive with PCE equipment on a cost basis. U.S.
House, supra, n. __, at 37-38 (testimony of DeSimone). Second, even a 50% tax credit would only reduce the
expected cost of a CO2 system to $75,000, a cost that most cleaners would not be willing to incur.
202 A tax credit equal to 50% of the purchase price would have a similar effect, with 30% of cleaners being either
somewhat or much more likely to switch.
201
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Intensity of Likelihood

Percentage Likely to Switch
$3,500

$7,000

$10,500

$14,000

$17,500

Rebate

Rebate

Rebate

Rebate

Rebate

Much More Likely

2%

5%

8%

9%

15%

Somewhat More Likely

8%

7%

9%

15%

13%

Much/Somewhat More

10%

12%

17%

24%

28%

Combined

Adoption of wet cleaning by 28% of cleaners would certainly provide a strong
foothold for wet cleaning in the sector, and would very likely enhance the
dissemination of information concerning wet cleaning among non-adopters.203
However, it is unclear how accurate the respondents’ reported predictions of their
own future behavior actually are. Research in cognitive psychology suggests that
such predictions should be viewed with caution.204

Moreover, the experience of

Oregon in implementing a pilot tax credit program for PCE dry cleaners suggests
that subsidies may not be particularly effective in encouraging the adoption of
environmentally beneficial technologies in this sector.205
The Oregon Pollution Prevention Tax Credit Program was a four-year pilot
program available to several industry sectors from 1996 through 1999.206

A dry

STONEMAN, TECHNOLOGICAL DIFFUSION, supra, n. __, at 184(discussing information spillovers that occur as more
firm adopt the innovative technology).
204 See Hyde, supra, n. __, at 392-394 (discussing psychological research indicating that people lack the ability to
identify and articulate their own cognitive and decision-making processes accurately).
205 There is surprisingly little empirical information available concerning the impact and effectiveness of subsidies
on diffusion generally. See, Jaffe & Stavins, supra, n. __, at S-44. Although a number of states have adopted tax
credit programs to encourage pollution prevention generally, research has revealed no published data concerning the
extent to which businesses have taken advantage of those generic tax credit programs. See, Lake, supra, n. __, at
__-__ (describing programs in Delaware, Rhode Island, New Jersey and other states).
206 It was designed to encourage businesses involved in dry cleaning, metal plating and halogenated solvent cleaning
sectors to reduce, eliminate or avoid the use of certain toxic chemicals, including PCE. Oregon appears to be one of
only two states that adopted a tax credit program specifically targeted at dry cleaning. Beginning in 2000, North
Carolina instituted an income tax credit equal to 20% of the cost of equipment that the State Department of
203
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cleaner installing equipment that reduced annual PCE usage to less than 140
gallons/year was eligible for a credit against income or corporate excise tax equal to
50% of the equipment cost. The Oregon credit was not widely used by any of the
eligible business sectors.

Although credits valued at $2.6 million dollars were

available, almost 2 million dollars remained unclaimed at the end of the program.
Among dry cleaners, only 24 of the 330 eligible cleaners in Oregon took advantage of
it. Of those 24 cleaners, only five purchased wet cleaning equipment. Most cleaners
instead purchased either advanced PCE machines (12 cleaners) or petroleum
machines (7 cleaners).207
It does not appear that the tax credit played a significant role in the
technology choices of most cleaners in Oregon, including those cleaners who took
advantage of it. In responding to a question included in the tax credit application
form, almost all of the applicants indicated that they would have made their
purchase even absent the tax credit.208 Nor did the credit appear to significantly
affect technology choices of cleaners purchasing wet cleaning systems.

During the

four-year life of the credit program, nine cleaners purchased wet cleaning systems
without seeking the benefits of the tax credit.209 This result is consistent with a

Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) certifies to be “qualified dry-cleaning equipment.” Section 105129.16C. The statute defines qualified dry-cleaning equipment to mean equipment that is used to “dry-clean
clothing or other fabric and does not use any hazardous solvent or any other substance that the [DENR] determines
to pose a threat to human health or the environment.” As of mid-2001, DENR had yet to receive an application for
certification of any equipment. Interview with Bruce Nicholson of DENR by Timothy Malloy (October 2001), DENR
had also received no applications or queries from potential wet cleaners, and believed that the tax credit would not
be available for wet cleaning equipment given the limitation in the statute to dry cleaning. Id.
207 Oregon Department of Environmental Quality, Pollution Prevention Tax Credit Application Status (undated
spreadsheet on file with authors).
208 Interview with David Kauth of the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality by Timothy Malloy (2001).
209 Interview with Ellen Glendening of the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality by Timothy Malloy (2001).
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study of subsidies for environmental expenditures in Germany. In that study, the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development found that firms typically
take advantage of such subsidies only when other regulations require the firms to
undertake the expenditures.210
Of course it is difficult to draw firm conclusions about the likely effectiveness
of a possible subsidy program for dry cleaners from one state’s experience. However,
one thing is clear: even if subsidies were ultimately effective, they would also be
quite expensive.211 Consider the survey results concerning purchase price rebates.
Looking to the mid-range rebate of $10,500 and assuming that 17% of the cleaners
take advantage of the rebate over a period of 10 years, the present value of the
rebates alone (without any consideration of administrative costs) would exceed 2.5
million dollars.212 If we assume instead that the rebate is $17,500 and it attracts
28% of the cleaners over ten years, the present value of the rebates will exceed 5
million dollars.213 These costs are obviously only rough estimates, and would vary
with the underlying assumptions adopted; yet there is little doubt that a meaningful
subsidy program would involve substantial expenditures by the government. These
costs could be avoided by using the alternative policy tool of a gradual phase-out of
PCE dry cleaning, which is examined below.

C.

Altering Legal Institutions

ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ___ (1989).
211 See, Jaffe, et al., supra, n. __, at 61-62.
212 This years, using a discount rate of 8%. We chose 10 years on the assumption that cleaners would only purchase
equipment as the current equipment wore out and, as we discuss below, the useful life of PCE equipment is
approximately 10 years.
213 This assumes that 437 cleaners enter the subsidy program over the course of ten years and that payments of
$765,000 are made at the end of each of those years, using a discount rate of 8%.
210
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The potential policy tools discussed thus far attempt to influence technology
choice without directly regulating the firm’s operations. We now turn to a policy
option that alters the regulatory environment in which the firms operate: an
outright ban on the use of PCE.

As discussed in Section I, regulators have

traditionally relied upon pollution control and risk management rather than
pollution prevention to address environmental and health concerns raised by
industrial activities.

214

Accordingly, product or process bans are fairly uncommon.215

Federal regulators have banned the use of a limited number of products, such as
polychlorinated biphenols (PCBs), DDT, and CFCs for general use.216

Recently

federal and state air quality regulators have prohibited the use of various toxic air
contaminants for specific uses, and in each case identified alternative products that
were available for the same use.217
A prohibition on PCE dry cleaning could be a remarkably effective tool to
switch cleaners away from PCE. By directly constraining technology choice within
the industry, a prohibition avoids the uncertainty associated with all of the other
policy options discussed above.

Neither enhanced enforcement of existing

regulations nor imposition of a moderately sized PCE excise tax is likely to have a

Indeed, on its face, Rule 1421 reflects a pollution control perspective to environmental policy; that is, the view
that the risks associated with PCE usage can be adequately managed through add-on pollution control equipment.
215 A prohibition can take the form of a ban on existing products or processes, or the “culling” or screening of new
ones in which the regulator has some type of prior approval authority. Stewart, supra, n. __, at 1296.
216 Hoerner, supra, n. __, at 187.
217 For example, in 2000, the California Air Resources Board prohibited the use of PCE and two other toxic
compounds in automotive consumer products after 2002 based on its judgment that non-chlorinated alternatives are
widely available and are as equally effective. California Air Resources Board, Staff Report: Initial Statement of
Reasons for the Proposed Airborne Toxic Control Measure for Emissions of Chlorinated Toxic Air Contaminants from
Automotive Maintenance and Repair Activities (2000). See also 40 C.F.R. Part 63, subpart Q (2002)(prohibiting use
of chromium additives in cooling towers).
214
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significant impact on the majority of cleaners. Standing alone, positive economic
incentives such as tax credits or subsidies would create a windfall for cleaners who
would switch to wet cleaning even absent the incentive, while having limited
influence on the majority of cleaners who view wet cleaning unfavorably. Moreover,
unlike enhanced enforcement of old Rule 1421, imposition of an excise tax, or
provision of a direct or tax subsidy, implementation of a prohibition would be
relatively straightforward and inexpensive. Presumably, the regulator can identify
virtually all PCE cleaners through its permitting database. Inspectors need only
check the shops after the effective dates to ensure that PCE machines or solvents
are not in use. Thus, social costs associated with enhanced enforcement, an excise
tax, or subsidies would be substantially avoided by relying on a prohibition.218
In concept, a prohibition can be designed to take immediate effect, and thus
cause a swift shift in technology. However, for an existing facility, an immediate
prohibition could impose a significant economic burden, depending upon whether or
not the facility has recovered its investment in the PCE equipment at the time the
prohibition takes effect.

In such cases, a gradual phase-out of the existing

equipment already in service is more appropriate. The phase-out period plays an
equitable role, balancing the need to reduce health and environmental impacts
against the social costs of a ban. A phase-out allows temporary continued use of the
PCE equipment—perhaps for the remainder of its useful life—and thus reduces the
facility’s economic loss. In contrast, no phase out period is needed for new facilities
beginning operations after promulgation of the prohibition. In fact, because the
capital and operating costs of wet cleaning are comparable to those of PCE dry
cleaning, a new facility suffers no significant costs as a result of the prohibition.

218

See text accompanying notes __-__.
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In December 2002, the AQMD Governing Board revised Old Rule 1421 to
prohibit the use of PCE dry cleaning equipment by any new facilities.219 Existing
facilities (i.e., shops in operation before January 2003) may continue to use PCE
equipment until December 31, 2020, subject to the proviso that no shop may operate
more than one PCE machine.220 The AQMD rule represents a significant movement
in regulatory policy towards pollution prevention and away from the traditional
approach of pollution control. However, it does suffer from two important flaws.
First, it fails to implement the phase out in gradual manner. Second, it delays the
prohibition effective date beyond the useful life of existing machines.
As currently designed, the AQMD phase out has no mechanism for a gradual
movement of existing dry cleaners to alternative technology, but rather simply
provides an eighteen year delay before the prohibition takes effect. As the effective
date of the prohibition approaches, cleaners with older PCE machines will become
less and less likely to purchase a new PCE machine. For example, in 2015, a PCE
dry cleaner with a ten-year-old machine will be reluctant to purchase a new PCE
machine, as she will only be able to use it for five years. Faced with the immediate
choice between buying a new wet cleaning machine and continuing to use an older

With respect to new cleaners (i.e. operations established after January 1, 2003), the Rule 1421 amendments have
essentially the same effect as declaring wet cleaning to be T-BACT. Amended SCAQMD Rule 1421(d)(1)(D). The
Rule 1421 amendments also have some significant impacts on existing cleaners. For example, although an existing
cleaner may replace existing PCE equipment as it wears out prior to the 2020, the cleaner may only operate one
such replacement unit. Thus, if an existing cleaner has two PCE units that wear out, it would have to replace the
second unit with a non-PCE alternative. Amended SCAQMD Rule 1421(d)(1)(F). Moreover, existing cleaners are
required to perform risk assessments and, if the risks exceed certain levels, take risk reduction measures. Amended
SCAQMD Rule 1421(d)(1)(F); SCAQMD Rule 1402.
220 SCAQMD Amended Rule 1421(d)(1)(F).
Existing facilities with more than one PCE system may use the
additional systems until the end of the extra system’s useful life. The restriction to only one PCE machine will
affect less than 5% of the facilities in the South Coast region. In addition, all PCE systems must install secondary
controls by November 1, 2007. Id.
219
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PCE machine, it is likely that many such cleaners will attempt to "get by" with the
older machine. As compared to new PCE equipment, the older machines are less
efficient in design and more likely to develop leaks.

Consequently, they are

significant sources of PCE emissions and the associated risks to human health.
Likewise, if a substantial number of cleaners wait until the end of the phase-out
period to switch to an alternative technology, there may be a shortage of equipment
causing a rise in prices and uncertainty. That situation could result in delayed
implementation of the prohibition. From a practical and political standpoint, the
regulatory agency will be vulnerable if cleaners, vendors and trade associations seek
an extension of the phase-out period until the equipment shortage eases.
In addition, the use of eighteen years as the phase out period is excessive
from a policy perspective. Assuming that the phase out period is intended to provide
existing cleaners with an opportunity to recover the value of their investment in the
equipment, the period should be limited to the expected useful life of the equipment.
A reasonable estimate of the life span of typical dry cleaning systems is ten years.
Industry representatives and government officials have identified “average” useful
lives spanning from eight to fifteen years.221 In identifying ten years, we focused on
how long machines can be maintained and operated properly. It is likely that a
facility, particularly a small one with limited cash flow, would attempt to keep a
machine for as long as possible, putting off expensive repairs and using the machine
even beyond the point that its emission controls will operate effectively. Interviews

221
A representative of the International Fabricare Institute stated in Congressional testimony that depending upon the model and
manufacturer, machines may last between “eight to twelve years to fourteen years.” U.S. House, supra, n. 32, (Fisher testimony).
EPA assumes a 15-year life. EPA, supra, n. __, at __. In our survey, based on the median age of existing machines and median
amount of time cleaners expected to retain their existing machines, it appears that cleaners expect to replace machines after
approximately fifteen years of use.
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of PCE machine distributors, repair technicians, and a dry cleaner consultant
suggest that ten years is an appropriate time period.222
The flaws in the AQMD revisions to Rule 1421 could be cured by requiring
existing cleaners to replace their PCE machines within ten years (or at the outside
fifteen years) from date the machine was first placed in service. The floating phaseout period should even out the rate of replacement across the period, preventing the
“bunching” of replacements that might otherwise occur at the end of the period. It
will also prevent cleaners from using deteriorating machines well past their useful
lives. The revisions to 1421 as originally proposed by the AQMD staff incorporated
such a gradual phase out, using a useful life of fifteen years. It appears that the
shift to a non-graduated eighteen-year phase out in the final rule resulted from
political accommodation and compromise rather than policy analysis. There was no
explicit discussion or analysis of the eighteen-year period during the rule making
proceedings before the Governing Board.
Standing alone, however, even a prohibition on PCE equipment does not
direct the industry towards clean technologies.

For example, even modified as

Of the three distributors contacted, one said the expected life of a dry clean machine is 10 years (Interview with
Kim Bailey of Iowa Techniques by Peter Sinsheimer (1997)), one said 7-10 years for most machines (Interview with
Tom Karman of Western Mutitex by Peter Sinsheimer (1997)), and one said 10-15 years (Interview with Norman
Korey of Wyatt-Bennett Inc. by Peter Sinsheimer (1997)). While two of the three repair technicians contacted said
that a dry clean machine could last fifteen years, the operator usually would have to practice a significant amount of
preventative maintenance, which is costly. Both said that rather than carry out preventative maintenance most
cleaners wait until a problem occurs, which leads to more significant problems, more costly repairs, and greater
overall deterioration of the machine. Interview with Eddy Centes of Pacific Equipment Company by Peter
Sinsheimer (1997); Interview with Art Khaiwara by Peter Sinsheimer (1997). One gave ten years as an average
estimate. Id. A third repair person said that dry clean machines are not designed to last longer than ten years. He
said the maintenance cost of operating a dry clean machine is very low for the first five years, yet becomes very
expensive for years five through ten and excessive afterwards. Interview with Steve Trainer of Iowa Techniques by
Peter Sinsheimer (1997). The dry cleaning consultant said that ten years is the figure he used for the expected life
of a dry clean machine. Interview with Ted Barry of John Barry and Associates by Peter Sinsheimer (1997).

222
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suggested above, the AQMD revisions to Rule 1421 would not prevent cleaners from
switching from PCE to petroleum solvents. In fact, the rule revision specifically
identifies petroleum dry cleaning as an approved alternative technology. Although
existing petroleum and synthetic petroleum solvents do not contain any listed toxic
air contaminants, they are sources of VOC emissions and other wastes and
industrial wastewaters.223
It is unclear just how many cleaners would choose petroleum cleaning over
dry cleaning however. In our survey, we asked cleaners which technology would be
their first and second choice in the event they had to replace the current machine.
As expected, PCE equipment was the overwhelming first choice. However, while 20
percent of those with a preference chose petroleum dry cleaning, 24 percent would
choose wet cleaning or CO2 systems. Forty-five percent expressed no preference for
any of the existing alternatives, and 6 percent would select a GreenEarth™ system.
Regulators could adopt at least two different approaches to the issue of PCE
substitution. First, given the uncertainty of the likely direction of the movement,
regulators could simply track cleaners’ the technology choices over the early years of
the phase out to determine whether significant movement to petroleum technology is
occurring. At the end of that tracking period, AQMD can assess the impact of the
prohibition on technology choice, and take further action if required. Petroleum dry
cleaning

systems

straightforward.224

require

permits,

making

tracking

them

relatively

This tracking approach would allow the regulators to avoid

See text accompanying notes __-__.
Given the fact that toxicity testing of GreenEarth™ systems has not been completed, regulators should also track
usage of those systems. GreenEarth™ operators must maintain operating records under SCAQMD Rule 1102, but
they need not obtain a permit or otherwise register with SCAQMD or other environmental agencies. Consequently,
new registration requirements must be created in order to track GreenEarth™ usage.
223
224
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further intervention and the associated administrative expense and social costs
unless the results of the tracking indicate such action is necessary.
Second, regulators could adopt one of the policy tools discussed above to
direct movement away from petroleum dry cleaning. For example, at the same time
it revised Rule 1421, AQMD also adopted a financial incentive program under which
early adopters of alternative technologies would receive grants from the Air Quality
Improvement Fund. The program provides $2,000,000 for grants of up to $10,000
for facilities adopting wet cleaning systems, and up to $5,000 for those adopting CO2
or GreenEarth™ systems.

In light of the uncertain direction of the expected

technology shift, it appears that adoption of this grant program may be premature.
Allocation of $2,000,000 for these purposes diverts the funds from other, without a
clear need for intervention or careful assessment of the appropriate form of such
intervention.

V. Conclusion
Which type of regulation leads to more innovation? One cannot answer that
question without knowing something about the selection environment. In the case
of dry cleaning in the south coast, the selection environment is such that a
prohibition is likely to be the most effective, least costly policy choice. However one
would expect the nature of the selection environment to vary from industry sector to
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industry sector.225

for example, the mechanisms for information dissemination

within the chemical manufacturing industry will likely differ from those within the
commercial printing sector.

So too, routines followed by firms in the

microelectronics industry in allocating resources to research and development may
also contrast with those of the petroleum refining industry.226

consequently, the

types of barriers to innovation vary across sectors, as will the effectiveness of
different forms of regulation. In other words, the relative value of command and
control rules and market-based regulation in encouraging innovation ultimately
depends on the nature of the selection environment in question.

NELSON & WINTER, supra, n. __, at 265-66.
See Malloy, Incentives, supra, n. __, at 598; David J. Teece, Firm Organization, Industrial Structure, and
Technological Innovation, 31 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 193, 211-14.
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